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Illegal immigrants from China are a special group that attracts
the attention of communication researchers in Hong Kong. This paper is
designed to study two areas. The first concerns the immigrants' consumption
and evaluation of the mass media when they were in the People's Republic of
China. The other is on the relations between media or communications and
the immigrants' decision to emigrate.
The first academic research of this kind, it is conducted in the
form of a series of structured interviews. Immigrants are contacted from
various sources including their resident communities, educational centres,
welfare centres, immigrants' organisation and personal friends. A total
sample of 236 immgrants is selected in this study.
Results of the interviews mainly fall in three categories: media
consumption frequency, media credibility and factors for their immigration
decision. First, immigrants social background such as education, occupation,
place of residence and family class origin are demonstrated to be fairly good
predictors of mass media consumption frequency. For credibility ratings, the
finding that the immigrants show considreable trust in the official media
defeats the common notion of the public's total distrust of the mass media in
a totalitarian society. Finally, results also indicate that personal communi-
cations are far more important than the mass media as sources of information,
reality validation and approval in the immigrants' process of knowing about
Kong Kong and decision-making. The immigrants' favourable image of Hong Kong,
the family push factor and group normative communications are found to relate
closely to their strength of determination to emigrate.
It is not our intention to generalise from the immigrant group to the
whole Chinese population. Our findings on the media behaviour of the immigrants,
at least, appear to be valid clues to the communication process in the PRC.
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Illegal immigration from China has become one of the major
problems in Hong Kong. A recently published government paper shows
that in the period 1979- 80, around 170,000 illegal immi grants
successfully crossed the border, making themselves citizens of
Hong Kong.*
Immigration has always been related to the conditions in two
societies the one from which one emigrates and the one which one
immigrates. The case of illegal imigration from China into Hong Kong
is of no exception. Generally, there are two explanations for
this illegal immigration- the first concerns the immigrants"
frustrations and grievances in China, social, political, economic or
psychological; the other lies in their favorable image of Hong Kong
in terms of its social.. political and economic conditions. The
two explanations are not mutually exclusive either one or both can
account for the immigration.
The present paper intends to study the relationships between
communication and illegal immigration from China into Hong Kong. The
main objective is to explore the role of media and other forms of
communication in affecting the immigrants' decision. More specifically,
Eiong Kong Government Secretariat, Background to the Problems of Illegal
Immigration from China into Hong Kong: An Information Paper 1980.
2trss study inciuaes two key areas. The first is to find out the
immigrants' consumption and evaluation of the mass media when they
were in China. This, we hope, can enlighten us on the actual scene
of mass persuasion in China. The other area is to examine the relations
between media or interpersonal communication and the immigrantst'
favourable view of Hong Kong, which includes the study of how they
are persuaded to go to Hong Kong.
The whole study is based on a review of literature on communication
in China and emprirical research on the illegal immigrants in Hong Kong
in 1981. The immigrants under research are expected to be those who
arriving at Hong Kong in or before 1980. The first communication
research on the illegal immigrants, it is taken in the form of a
series of structured interviews guided by a fixed-type questionnaires
The paper is organised into four chapters. The first chapter
gives a picture of the media systems and communication patterns
in the Peoples s Republic of China (PRC) and the use of media for mass
persuasion from the early PRC up to 1980. A discussion on major
theories, related concepts and hypotheses follows in the second
chapter. Chapter three is a report on the interveiws with the
illegal immigrants. Analysis of the findings,, discussion and
conclusion are all included in the fourth chanter
3Chapter I
Communication and Mass Persuasion in Communist China
Media Systems and Communication Patterns in Communist China
Like other totalitarian societies, the PRC has adopted a
political model of mass communication. By political, we mean that
mass communications are expected to be an instrument of political
policy and guidance, rather than assuming the ordinary informative
function.1 The media system in China, therefore, is controlled and
vigorously used by the Chinese leadership, primarily as an instrument of
developing socialism and, eventually, communism in the country. The
Lenin doctrine that the press should be a collective propagandist,
a collective agitator, a collective organiser is the guiding principle. 2
As the media are closely related to politics in the PRC, policies
concerning them differ according to who is in command. C.C. Lee pointed out
the differences between the Maoists and the pragmatists in their views on
mass media.3 11hereas Mao constantly advocated that the mass media must
staunchly possess a class character to serve proletarian interests and
safeguard the dictatorship of the proletariat, and that the party must
have strict control of journalism, the pragmatists stress the importance
of economic, educational and cultural aims of the media and the risk of
ideological overdosage and its adverse consequence for non-political
functions. The-two groups also cannot compromise on the issue of
mass-line journalism versus professional journalism, or in other words.
4on the controversy of "red" versus "expert". Although such differences
appear striking, mass media development followed the Maoists who were
in control of the party for most of the communist regime.
While Leet s comparative analysis has highlighted the main
characteristics of the Chinese media--- its proletarian class character
and mass-line base, Alan Liu's study of communication and national
integration in Communist China added another three nualties to the
Chinese media.4 He argued that the three essential parts of every mass
medium, namely, structure, content and audience, are highly integrated
into the total ,system of Chinese polity. First, each mass medium
organization is tied into the political structure at central, regional
and local administrative levels. Structural integration of this kind
leads to the control of contents by the ruling party and more important,
to ensuring consistency between media content and the predominating
ideology---- a. kind of content integration. The final integration---
audience integration is made possible by 'tide linkage between the mass
media with face-to--face communication. China has been able to use
word-to-mouth communication to assist the mass media in reaching
a bigger audience and in bridging the gaps between the media and
the audience.
Both Lee and Liu's ideas cennot be firmly established without
a close look into the development and the general outlook of the
four major mass media in the PRC.
5A. The Press
1. Function
Ever since the Communists took over China, they have been keeping
a close eye on the press. Inspired by the Lenin doctrine that the
press is a collective propagandist, a collective agitator, and a
collective organiser, Mao assigned five major functions to the provincial
press. They are: "to organise, to stimulate, to agitate, to criticize
and to propel"5
i) To organise is accurately to propagate the objectives,
policies and directives of the party it is to mobilise
and organise all people into a. powerful force to realise
and to struggle for the various great tasks prescibed
by the party at different stages in history.
ii) To develop fully the function of agitation and stimulation,
editors must wholeheartedly integrate the creativeness of
the masses with their emotions and energy to reflect
accurately and timely the accomplishments of the various
fronts they should further learn to make use of the
experience of the peoples s success to suggest new demands,
to agitate the masses to compete with or challenge those
who have gained early success.
iii)The most important function of criticism of the press is
to be able to select issues and to prosent convincing
arguments to attack the various shades of opportunism,
conservation and destructive capitalism, to assure the
establishment of socialism, to conquer pessimism and to
mobilise aggressivism.
In a national press meeting called in March 1950, a four-point
directive was issued to newspapers, news agencies, broadcasting-stations
and other news media:
i) Newspapers should devote more space and give prominence
to reports on the progress of the peoples s labor and
production, publicising the experiences of success as
well as the lessons of error derived from the work of
production and financial and economic tasks, and
discussing methods of overcoming difficulties in such
tasks.
6ii) Newspapers should reorganise their functional structure
in such a way that direction and management would be
dentralised in the hands of the editors.
iii) Newspapers should consider the establishment and direction
of "corresponding networks and nows papor-reading groups
as their major political n sl.
iv) Newspaper should assume responsibility for criticism of
the wealmesses or mistakes of the government agencies'
economic organization and government personnel, but such
criticisms should be truthful and constructive. They
should pay the greatest attention to the handling of
letters to the editor.6
Under these broad objectives and directions, the Chinese press
operates as a party tool and the journalists assume the role of a
propagandist and fighter of the political ideological battle.
2. Structure
The Chinses press system can be categorised into five types of
newspaper.. in terms of their o'-mership.7 The most important one is
the party press, which can be further divided into national, regional,
and local press, corresponding to the organisational structure of
the party. The Propaganda Department of the Party Committee at each
territorial level is responsible for organising and supervising the
party press at that level.
The l eopleT s Daily the national and central newspaper, is the
organ of the Central Committee, Under the jurisdiction of the central
Politburo, it spews for the Central People' s Government, and is always
the first paper to bring any intended policy changes or political
7campaigns to the people's attention. It publishes party and government
decisions, and more important, explains the significance of current
issues and problems from the I4orxist Leninist viewpoint. A paper of
authority, its editorials and special articles are constantly reprinted
by other party papers all over the country. It is the newspaper with
the largest circulation in China. Excluding the free and exchange copies,
it had a circulation of over six million in 1979.8
At the regional level, every provincial and municipal party
committee publishes a newspaper, usually n incd for the province or
municipality. Except for some issue of local interest, these
provincial papers bear much similarity in foz-Ln and content to the People' s
Daily. These papers also publish rural editions to serve the countries
and communes within their territory which do not have any newspaper
of their own. It is estimated that the party press including national,
provincial and local press had a total circulation of slightly more than
9
sixty million in December, 1979.9
The second type of newspaper includes those owned by mass
organisations, such as the China Youth Daily of the Chinese Communist
Youth League, the Iiwong Ming Daily of the former Democratic League,
and the Workerst Daily of the National Workers Union. As these
organisations ore Fractions of the Party, their newspapers are in fact
under the unified leadership of the Party Central Committee. In both
appearance and substance, they resemblo most of the party pross.
8The institutional press published by public institutions such as
schools, colleges, factories, and other public agencies,makes the
third type of newspaper. They are mainly used as a complement to the
public press and for internal circulation only.
The fourth type is the military press. The Liberation Army Daily,
the dentral military press, is run by the General Political Department
of the Ministry of Defence, and distributed to military units and
state institutions for internal circulation. Each garrison district
and military unit also publishes its o m paper as its mouthpiece.
The final type refers to those which do not have any orgcnisational
base. They are the ones which existed before 1949 and are retained
because of their pro-communist views. They are mainly circulated in
the cities of the eastern part of the country. They do not have a
significant role and influence in the total press system
A review of the structure of these five types of newspapers would
immediately demonstrate the kind of structural integration that Alan
Liu suggests. The Party Committee at each territorial level, as the
organising bodies of the party press, have direct authority over the
papers published at different regions and localities. They are also
responsible for the supervision of the papers of mass organisations,
institutions and those without any organisational base. Although
the military press is not the party committee' concern, it is
9controlled by the Ministry of Defense. The whole organisation of
the Chinese.press shows a very intimate link with the political
structure in the PRC.
In 1980, all together, there were more than 328 newspapers in the
country, with a total circulation of about 38 million.10 The party press
and the military press are able to penetrate into lower organisational
levels, the other papers are mostly circulated in the urban areas.
In fact, except for a few rural editions of the party press, newspapers
not very common in the rural areas of the country.
3. Operation
Each newspaper has its own editorial staff, which is usually
supervised by an editorial committee headed by the editor-in-chief.
All the staff are state employees. The size of the staff team varies,
but the provincial papers normally have a rather big staff as compared
to that in the postern countries.Table 1:1 shows the size of the
editorial staff of some of the dailies in China in 1979.11 The big
sizes apparently are a result of some of the built--in problems of the
press system like the rigid divisi
on of work and the necessity for
multiple approval of each article.
10
Table 1.1 Size of Editorial Staff in Chinese Press










Before the Cultural Revolution, personal background (usually
requiring a three-generation political purity) was the first criterion
for entering into the journalistic team political performance came
next, and talent last.12 Now,more emphasis is put on the professional
competence of the journalists. 13 With the revival of journalism
departments at the three big universities, quite a number of the well-
qualified journalism graduates have joined the staffs.
To follow Mao's mass-line journalism policy, two special featuros
emerge into the journalists' work. The first one is the setting up
of the correspondence network, and the other is working uith the mass".
The establishment of the correspondent network is similar to the Soviet
Rabssel'kor, the Worker and Peasont Correspondent Movement.14 Any
woman or man can write to the newspaper about his experience, his
political life, his work, etc., and become a correspondent. As this
was already a much-advocated policy in early Communist China, most
newspapers claimed to have a huge army of correspondents. In 1950,
Ho Pei Jih Pao (Hopei Daily) claimed to have 1,600 correspondents,
Fu Kien Jih Pao (Fukien Daily) 5,000, and Lao Tun Pao (Labour Daily)
15
as many as 7,000. This kind of network appears to be operating
well. In 1973, in Hunan Province alone, amateur correspondents accounted
for 90% of the 1,097 stories contributed to the provincial newspaper
16
and radio stations, and 35% of the 620 stories printed or broadcast.
Apart from its help for on propaganda, function of the Party, the
correspondent network also is regarded as a method of training
17
journalists for the communist press.
This type of network definitely goes in line with China!s two
operational strategies: walking on two legs, which means a close
collaboration of professional with non-professional journalism; and
three-in-one-combination which actually refers to the unity of Party
18
leadership, professional journalists, and the mass in reporting.
The whole idea is that these amateur correspondents are politically
safe if correctly guided by the party local revolutionary units, they
can work alongside their professional collegues on a complementary
basis and make contributions to the betterment of the press.
The other policy is working with the mass . According to
Mao, journalists, in order to write truthfully about the mass, must firs'
12
understand them. It is only by actual participation into mass work
and direct rolo-taking that the intellectually-inclined journalists
can empathise with the people. Under these assumptions, journalists
are required to work in factories or communes for three months each
year so as to obtain practical experience, to be educated by the mass, and.
raise their political awareness.19 This arrangement is a typical
reflection of Mao t s anti-elitist and anti-intellectual" orientation.
4. Content
Except for a few issues of local inter,,t oaid some special stork:
by correspondents, most of the news appearing in the Chinese Communist
press today comes from the offices of the stato--owned. New China. News
Agency, the major news agency in China, As Schramm noted in his recent
study, Hsinhua (the Now China News Agency), is still the chief supplier
of news to all the media in China., from the People's Daily to the
smallest commune news.sheet.20 it is important that the, IIsinhua is
the source of both domestic and. foreign news. On one hands, it
publishes the Reference News, an edition of international news with
a circulation of eleven million in 197921 and on the other hand, it
disseminates news through its bureaus or sub-bureaus at various regions
and places to the local press. Reference News is unique among
communist publications in that it reprints foreign news even when
unfavorable to China.
13
Although, Hsinhua is the centralised channel of news, its messages
are not.required to be repeated verbatim by local newspapers, The
reason for this is not that the local paper are to add some local
color to the stories. Rather, they are expected to relate the issues
to the local situation, and more important, to set the stage for local
22
propaganda and agitation activities.
Except for the above-mentioned local application of some news
stories, most of the provincial and municipal papers do not differ
much. They are all four-page newspapers and are cast almost in the same
23
mold as the People's Daily.
With an entirely different concept of news, the Chinese press
varies greatly from the western ones in its handling of news stories
and writing style. Frederick Yu, in his early study on the press,
found that the newspapers were puny in volume, and drab in appearence. 24
Lu Keng more recently used four words to describe the Communist press-
25
scarce, slow, bad mid wa.steful. "scarce refers" to the little space
devoted to news in the western sense (sometimes even lower than 30%).
Most of the space, Lu noted, is hegemonized by lengthy and dull
articles. The lack of timeliness in the handling of news is Lu's
criticism of the 'slow' nature of the Chinses press. A good example
to illustrate this is the late announcement of the Lin Piao Incidient-
a month later than the actual event. "Bad" best describes the poor
selection of news stories and the low quality of news presentation.
14
By "wasteful", Lu means that every news story has to travel to many
different concerned parties to be assessed before actual publication
the more important articles even have to be submitted to the Party
Central Committed for review and approval. Subsequently much time
and effort is wasted and the news become the "old" or even history.
Whereas Lu is totally against the way news is treated in Communist
China, Yu took a more neutral attitude in his recent trip back to
China. He remarks that there is now more news more news stories,
shorter and more lively than in the day of the Gong of Four and
some of the papers one beginning to include more local news and human
interest stories with humor. and lively presentation. 26
B. Radio Broa.dcastin
In the. PRC, radio broadcasting can broadly be divided into
two types: wired broadcasting and wireless broadcasting. The
first type is especially characteristic of Chines mode of mass




Immediately after the Communists had conquered the mainland, they
began to establish radio network systems. At that time, faced with
insufficient radio facilities and limited resources available for
15
broadcasting, the communists developed their "line broadcasting"
(Youxian guangbo), a system, of point-to-point radio communication,
with dissemination of selected programs at the point of reception by
wired loudspeakers. 27 This kind of wired network is venr similar to
the radio exchange system in the Soviet Union.
At- first, the development of line broadcasting took place mainly
in government agencies, units of the People's Liberation Army, and
mass organisations. In 1951, it was extended to fa.ctories, mines and
enterprises in the county for the following functions: 28
i) In the dormintories of all factories, mines, and enterprises,
the administrative staff members, union officers, and
representatives from workers' families should work
together to organise radio receiving groups so that all
workers and their families can constantly receive political
and cultural education. If conditions permit, wired
speakers must be provided.
ii) In those organisations where loudspeakers are available,
the: main tasks are as follows: to organise various kinds
of progrems in harmony with the production, learning,
and cultural recreational activities of the organisation
to complete the specially assigned tasks of the higher
authorities and to relay programs concerning working
people from the People's Broadcasting Station.
Lii) All labour unions in factories, mines and enterprises
must consider radio-receiving and broadcasting as the major
task of the department handling cultural and educational
affairs. They should constantly direct such activities
and make full use of broadcasts to push forward the
programs of production, to organise current affairs
study groups, and to develop all political 11 educational,
and cultural activities.
In 1955, Peking began to extend line broadcasting. to the rural
areas. The policy, set out by the Third National Conference on
Broadcasting Work, was to call for: Reliance on the masses; utilisation
of existing equipment, development by stages and gradual regular!sation
of the network; first reaching the villages and then the co-operatives,
pg
and later the homes of the peasants It was also expected to sot
up a receiving system in each co-operative or village within twelve
30 .
years time The promotion of wired broadcasting in rural setting
was not an isolated policy, it was closely related to agricultural
policies in the villages It was a part of the leftward turn in
political and economic development In working with the mass resistant
peasants, the government needed the wired radios to facilitate the
PasH T ai n rr 4 o o1- n »
The line broadcasting system is regularly used for the
political and cultural education of the peasants, the
improvement of mass political work in the rural areas,
the promotion of the political and production enthusiasm
of the peasants, the extension of advanced experiences
in agricultural production, and the enlivenment of the
cultural life in the rural areas. The rural broadcasting
network also plays a marked role in the forecasting of
weather conditions for the protection of agricultural
J X • ? 1
Line broadcasting is still an efficient system of communication
in rural areas. On one hand, it is a cheap and technically simple devic(
on the other, it acts as a voice of the central government and meets
local interests and cultural diversities.
b) Structure and Operation
Tho whole radio broadcasting network is organ!sod on throe
operational levels: central, regional and local — which correspond
QO
to the three major geographical divisions of administration. ~ The
Central Station is Radio Beijing, operated by the Central People's
Broadcasting Station, and representing the voice of the Central
Committee of the Communist Party. Regional broadcasting consists
of both provincial and municipal radio stations.
Wired broadcasting goes into the category of local broadcasting
in the communes, factories, schools and mining areas. Usually, an
ordinary radio station is built in every county. It monitors programs
from central, provincial and municipal stations, and also originates
its own programs. Wires are extended from the radio station to all
the villages within its jurisdiction, connected to loudspeakers
mounted at dormitories, commercial dwellings, market places, torn
halls, village centres,, and on the walls of individual peasant home.
The operating system is very simple. It consists primarily of a-
transformer, a loudspeaker, a switch and a volume control. The monitor
can either connect the speaker system with local or national programmes
or design programmmes for his audience.
Table 1.2 shows the growth in the number of rural wired
broadcasting stations and loudspeakers in China from 194-8 - 1964..
Table 1-2 Growth in the Number of Rural Wired Rrondonatin? Gta+.i one
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It was estimated that by 1964-, there were six million loudspeakers
in China, and that 95% of the counties and towns in rural China wero
3
connected with the wired radio network,'' f A further development is
noted in the period 1964. - 1975 Table 1 ,3 shows the penetration of
35
wired broadcasting into communes, brigades and peasants1 homes.
Table 1,3 Penetration of Loudsneakera
TN •
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In 1976, vured radio reached 92% of villages and 70% of the
36
peasants1 homes. The total number of loudspeakers was reported to
be 150 million. By 1978, the stations were able to reach 94-% of the
rural production brigades. At present, there are about 150 million
37
wired loudspeakers in China, Although the figures do show that the
number of loudspeakers is growing, they do not suggest that they are
functioning smoothly. Problems like poor management, lack of good
maintenance, constant breakdown of the vired networks during storms,




In the beginning, the policy for local stations was: to rebroadcast
39
is the major task; to originate programmes locally is secondary duty,
Later, there was a shift to the importance of locally-produced
programmes. At the Fourth National Conference of Broadcasting 1956,
it was decided that while to relay certain programmes of the Central
People's Broadcasting Station at specified hours is necessary, a more
important task should be to strive to improve locally-originated
programmes. A general policy for local programmes was as follow:
The major content of locally-originated programmes
should be: to publicize and promote agricultural
co-operatives, to constantly stimulate the enthusiasm
for labour among peasants; to agitate for high
agricultural production, and to satify the peasants'
demands for culture life. All these should be done b
making use of model or progressive activities and
introducint their progressive experience.
In actual broadcasting, national and local programmes seem to
t
have more or less equal, footing.
News dictation programmes and propaganda items dominated almost
all radio stations, from central to local ones, in the early days.
There is, however, growing attention to the use of musical, cultural
and educational programmes as subtler ways of political socialisation.
In local wired broadcasting particularly, educational items on
production methods and techniques, on work-experience sharing, and
weather reports have become the most popular programmes for the
majority of the peasants.'
The feature which helps bring the contents more closely to the
audience is collective listening. Workers in the factories, peasants
on farms, and people of low cultural standards in cities are organised
and mobilised to form radio-listening groups or led to join
broadcast assemblies. Trained monitors are responsible for planning
suitable programmes for these groups. In these collective listening
situations, the people can discuss and openly criticise the broadcasts
and acquire a better understanding of the issues. Although the
Communists claimed that collective listening does not suit the
characteristics of broadcasting and the ideal is to make the radio
A3
a medium for each family and individual, such group listening and
discussion continues to take place in many parts of the country.
2, Wireless Broadcasting
The main differences between wired and wireless broadcasting lies
in the degree of control of the listener. Whereas the audience of
wired broadcasting practically has no control over either channels
or contents, the wireless radio set owners can enjoy more choice —
they can freely select from available stations and programmes. Very
little is known about the growth of radio sets in China, Chen llin
noted that in 1972, about twenty-six cities were able to mass produce
transistor radios, and that the radio set sales in 1971 were ten times
that in 195, and ie price of a radio set was on the decline.4 Also,
r
there are far more private sets in the cities than in rural areas. J
The first and largest radio station in China is the Central
People's Broadcasting Station (CBPS), transmitting nation-wide. It
broadcasts daily on five separated channels for a total of more than
ninety hours in different dialects. Besides, there are ninety-three
stations run by provinces, municipalities, autonomous regions arid
cities under provincial jurisdiction. With the urge for the Four
Modernisations and the influx of radio sots from I long Kong, radio
sets have become much more common. In 1979, radio sets in use were
estimated at about fifty-five million. Apart from national broadcasting,
the Chinese also can hear messages from many foreign stations such
as the BBC, the VOA and Radio Hong Kong.
C. Film
1. Functio
Like the other mass media, films have been used as a political
weapon by the Communists. Well before they came to power, they had
inj.ilorated the film industry, controlled the script-writing departments
of major studios and successfully introduced the main themes of
Marxist doctrine to the screen.
Film, as an audio—visual medium , has often been regarded as one
of the most effective mass media for communicating with illiterate
IS)
and intellectually insophisticated people.Lenin indirectly supported
this when he stated that When the masses take possession of the film
and it comes into the hands of true supporters of socialist culture,
50
it will become one of the most powerful means of educating the masses.
To the Chinese Communists, films are definitely a significant branch
of MlA mnss mftfli n ri t.hp fol 1 ntri ricr mi cj.qt nn1
To reflect speedily the new era, and new society especially
the new men, new events, new heroes, new ideologies, new
emotions, new morality, and new qualities during the period
of socialist revolution and socialist development — and
through all this to propagate thesocialist and communist
51
Putting this big mission in simple terms, the film is expected
to be a tool to educate the people in socialism and patriotism, and
to raise cultural standards. In accordance with these purposes, th
film industry must concentrate all its energies on producing films
or significance to all the masses of the people, dealing with their
i
life, thoughts, and age-long strivings, with the insights of a
5°
developed revolutionary artistic vision.
In a large peasant society like China, more specifically, films
are used to bring news to remote areas, inform the people of the
North about accomplishments in the South, equip the peasants with
scientific knowledge on production, educate people in modern techniqu
of family planning, promote mass political campaigns, and simply
53
entertain. Such varied use of films shows that the political
function, though important, has seldom outweighed the possible
informative and educational sides of the films.
2. Structure and Operation
(
In the early years of Communist rule, the Chinese film industry
was concentrated in three cities and organised according to
5A
specialisation. One. city centre was responsible for dubbing Chinese
sound-tracks onto Soviet films; the other specialised in the making
of feature films and newsreels while the third took charge of
education and science films and occasionally dubbed a Chinese
55
sound-track onto some progressive European films.
By 1958, at the peak of the agricultural reforms, seeing that
films produced at urban centres could hardly affect the peasant masses
because of differences in languages and culture, the Communists
pushed for the establishment of a semi-independent film enterprise
at each of the major geographical regions to meet regional needs.
Although this proposed regional structure never materialised, a
system of provincial newsreels and documentary studios did come
forth, and acted as functional equivalents of the rural radio station
and rural newspapers installed fruing that period.
People have- access to movies in two forms: cinemas and mobile
25
film projection teams. Whereas the cinemas are always located at
urban centres, the mobile teams reach the remote areas. A unique
feature developed from the particular conditions in China, the
mobile teams display a variety of functions. On one hand, they
bring films to different rural corners where cinemas are technically
not feasible, on the other, they help bridge the languages and
cultural gaps which exist between the urban-made films and the local
peasants. Pre-show discussions propaganda and introductions,
impromptu explanations and post-show discussions are organised by
the team to ascertain that the films have reached the intended
audience and are correctly understood by them. 56
With the set up of cinemas and the mobile teams, the whole film
industry developed rapidly between 1950 and 1960.57 The number of
workers at various departments of the state-operated film industry
rose from three thousand to ninety thousand. Major studios went
from three to twelve. Motion picture cinemas climbed from 520 to
almost 1,800, and mobile teams from 500 to over 9,000. The total
film audience-jumped from 150 million to more than five billion per
year. Although few statistics are available in the early sip-ties
and after the Cultural Revolution, all related evidence seems
to suggest that film production has been on the rise.58 A most
recent study on the leisure industry in China finds that the Chinese
film industry appears to be undergoing a renaissance. In 1978,
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attendance at cinemas was reported to be .Ln astounding more than
twenty-two billion, and the number of mobile teams increased to
ninety thousand.59 Films are becoming very popular in China. One
recent article even headlined, Film-watching is No. 1 Pastime in
China".
3. Content
The general principle is that films must be politically correct,
or at the very least, not question the government' a policies or
cause any consternation among the people. Two big categories of films
exist in China: Chinese productions and the foreign supplies.
The Chinese productions can be further divided into five types. 6C
The first., feature-length dramas, were based on the western model of
realistic film style. They flourished in the early period and
ceased to be produced during the Cultural Revolution. Type two
refers to those fine arts films which deal with special aspects of
Chinese art and cultural history. Newsreels constitute the third
type. They are visual accounts of current domestic affairs and
relation with foro:i gn• countrios. The fourth type Faro documentaries.
They usually centre on a single theme which is related to the
socialist construction and some special issues. The final category
are the educational and scientific films. They are mainly instructional
films on matters like sex education, village health care, farm
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technology etc. While newsreels and documentaries appear to have
dominated in the early periods of socialist construction in China,
educational and scientific films were never displaced, and have
gradually assumed greater significance with the call for economic
development and modernisation.
Foreign supplies consists of a rather ti ridespread distribution
of foreign features, documentaries, ne isreels, and educational films.
In the early years after 1949, China, depended greatly on Soviet films
and supplies from Eastern and Western Europe and other Asian countries
to meet the public demands for films when its own film industry was
in the process of reconstruction. Except for during the Cultural
Revolution, the import of foreign films have continued until now.
Again, imported films on education and technology have become much
more important in Chin's process of modcrnisation.
In 1978,it was estoated matiea tnat in gins, there were still one
hundred films pro4luced before the Cultural Revolution, thirty-nine
new Chinese features, twenty foreign features films and several




Television is the youngest mass medium in the PRC. It was quite
undeveloped in the early years and the sixties. Its rapid growth comes
only within the last few years. Functionally, apart from the usual
political propaganda which is embedded in every Chinese mass medium, it
has heavy emphasis on the educational and informative aspects.62 As
televition develops mainly after the fall of the Gang of Four, its major
line follows the pragmatists,, and is closely related to the PRC's
modernisation, technological advancement and economic growth.
2. Structure and Operation
Beijing Television Station started broadcasting experimentally on
May 1, 1958, and formally on September 2, the same year.63 By the end
of 1959, there were ten stations set up at the major cities, receiving
programmes broadcast by the Beijing Station. More stations were constructed
in the late sixties and the early seventies. Colour television started
on May 1, 1973 by the Beijing Television Station. By 1978, all provinces,,
municipalities and autonomous regions have their own stations-thirty-two
in all. Beijing station was renamed China Central Television in May 1,
the same year. In 1979, the Central Television Station started to use
satellite in broadcasting important national and international events.
An official Chinese publication reported that in 1980, there were totally
seven central television stations and twenty-nine relay stations.64
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Production of television sets in the PRC began in 1956. With
increasing annual output, in the year 1970 alone, totally 10,000 sets
were produced. By the end of the seventies, there were around fifty
television factories which produced 9-inch black-and-white and 12-inch,
14.inch and 16-inch integrated circuit models. In 1979, there were about
three million television sets,65 mainly distributed in the big cities.
The coloured ones were heavily distributed in the province of Guangdong,
being imports from Hong Kong to their relatives in China. Apart from
family ownership, a sizable number are owned by factories, offices and
commune brigades.66
Central Television Station is headed by a director and deputy
director under the Central Broadcasting Administration. At each level
of administration, there are party members at a parallel level 'who have
direct authority and control over the television broadcast. Overall,
the Chinese Communist Party is the controlling body of all the stations
in the country.
3. Content
Programmes in the late fifties were mainly news and some old movies.
From the beginning of the sixties, television was almost entirely used
for political propaganda. It was until the late seventies that television
programme began to change to informative, entertaining and educational themes.
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News, entertainment, education, and advertisement items constituted
the core of television programmes in the PRC.67 Domestic news and forei
news split the half-hour nationwide joint newscast. While official
ceremonies of receptions headed by national leader dominate the domestic
news, there are also documentary-like items on China's economic and
social development. Foreign news is mostly taken from Visnews via
satellite. Interviews with important visitors from foreign countries
are also seen in television news. The general tone of the news reporting
is to support and propagate the Communist Party policies.
Educational programmes are arranged by the Central Television and
Radio Broadcasting University under the joint sponsporship of the Ministry
of Education and the Central Broadcasting Administration. There are
basic courses on science,, medical knowledge, mathematics, mechanical and
electrical engineering,, and English language. In 1979, throughout the
country,, some 100,,000 students were enrolled in some kind of courses or
programmes through watching television, with a total teaching crew of
10,000, part-time and full-time.68
Entertainment items including singing and dancing celebration,
stage operas, drama, movies and acrobatics are popular television
programmes in the PRC.69 Many of the film shown on TV are supplies
from foreign countries like U.S.A. and other communist countries.
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Although these items mainly come from the central, there is growing
concern on local productions.
Advertisements have revived in Chinese television in these few
years. Ads for foreign watches, television sets, consumer goods
and domestic products now appear to a considerable extent on the
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television screens They, on one hand.. inform the, rm people about
new products, and on the other, arouse people's interest in these
goods. This seems to relate closely to the modernisation policies
of the PRC,
To sum up, the Chinese mass media appeared to follow the
Maoist line as the major tools of political propaganda from the
early years up to the mid-seventies. After the fall of the Gang
of Four, the mass media have changed from their major function of
indoctrinating the political ideology to 'a more balanced direction
themes. This shift of focus reflects considerably the close relation
between the China's media policies and its economic development and
modernisation.
putting more emphasis on educational, informative and entertainment
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Mass Persuasion in the PRC
A. Characteristics of Communication in the PRC
A review of the function, structure and operation of the four
more developed mass media (the press, radio broadcasting, film and television)
in Communist China shows clearly the two distinct intentions of the
communicator, the Communist Regime strict control of the mass
media, -and dominance of their persuasive function. These intentions
will each be examined closely in the following paragraphs.
Ithiel De Sola Pool, in his study on communication in totalitarian
societies, has highlighted several characteristics of communication
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under strict governmental control. First, controlled communications
tend to be formalised and stilted. Constant exposure to these
rigid and repetitive communications both in form and content had made
the public inattentive, apthetic and apolitical. More important, the
public generally lacks confidence in official media and resorts to
other personal trustworthy sources for information. Also, in their
hunger for fact and information, the public learns to read between
the lines and tries to interpret clues to the truth that are buried
in the information available to them and thus develops strong
inclinations on esoteric communications. The overall result of such
type of communication is a. Fragile national unity and cohesion.
L assive conformity override internalised acceptance in the people's
reactions to the demands of theovernment.
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The extent to which De Sola Pool-I s postulates apply to the
Chinese scene has to be further explored in this stucr. However, at
least, Frederick Yu, Alan Liu and Martin King Whyte., from their own
researchers on contemporary China, support most of De Sola Pool's ideas
to a considerable extent.
Frederick Yu noted several weaknesses of communication in the
early. years of the PRC. 72 The first one he. named was repetition.
The Chinese people have been forced to listen to their Marxist
rulers' ideas and views over and over again, through all the different
media the same messages presented in endless varied ways. This
has instilled boredom, apathy and indifference among the masses.
Second., the dominance of formalism and routine in the communication
has also resulted in the people reacting dutifully and ritualistically
with no genuine interest and motivations.
In exploring the role of media in national integration in
the PRC., Alan Liu also found that the Chinese Communist Regime
has accomplished its task of penetration by the use of media, to bring
about political consciousness of identity from without, between the
ruler and the ruled, 73 In other words, the Communists have
used the media for political control, resulting in a rather fragile
national cohesion which lacked true conformity.
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in another study on relations between the small groups and
political rituals in the PRC, Martin King Whyte concluded in
more cr less the same way as Alan Liu that the small groups serve
more for maintenance and as social control devices, and have very
little effect on attitude change. 74 Most people develop their most
meaningful primary groups ties outside the official structure and
regard them as more trustworthy sources of information.
To sum up the effects of the strict control of the moss medin
China appears to share a few significant characteristics with other
totalitarain societies as shown in the above studies. Repetition,
formalism and routine have generated a rather apathetic and indifferent
public. The Chinesepeople reacted to the mediaritualistically w thou genuine interest, They also have developedtheir private channelsof
communication in the process of information seeking. The overall
situation is that the media have a strong controlling function but
have relatively less impact on the integration of the nation.
B. Assumption and Rationale of Chinese Mass Persuasion
in studying the mass persuasion in the PRC, its unique
social and cultural background must be taken into consideration,
particularly when the analysis is focused on a comparative basis.
Philosophically, the western model of persuasion is mainly based on
genuine interest. They also have developed their private chanels of
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learning theories and communication practicos in domocrati societies.
The basic assumption is that man is rational and should be given a.
free and fair choice to distinguish truth from error. 75 In this
manner, he should be exposed to various persuasive messages and select
those he thinks most reasonable and acceptable. Therefore, the
communicator's job is not to disallow difference in opinions but
to skilfully present the right kind of information to the. right audience,
taking into account its existing predispositions and groups affiliations. 76
Following learning theory then, the right information will change the
audience's preception of the environment and consequently also its
motivation and attitudes and behaviour. In order to persuade
effectively, issues of source credibility, style on presentation,
types of appeals and nature of the medium are to be considered carefully.
The Chinses society differs in a number of ways from the western
society.democratic ones. First, it is basicasllY a huge agricultural society.agricultural society
When the Communists came to power, the country was poor and lacked the
resources for modern industry as well as for modern communication
system. Its main resource lies in manpower. And, with a distinct
Marxist orientation, it has an entirely different view on how media
are related to the people. Consequently, it has adopted its own
approach to persuasion based on the assumptions of the Marxist
ideology and the unique social conditions Taced in the process of
national development.
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Dominating the persuasive function of mass communication in
the PRC is in line with the political model of communication
in Marxist societies. The main argument is that communication,
systems are tools to bring about ideologicol unanimity which is basic
to state solidarity and advancement in every communist state 77
The basic assumptions are that thought determines actions and
that correct politic],. and ideological work takes command. In order
to build a sow :i oundation for planed political, economic social
and cultural change,, attitudes and ideas must be first revolutional.ised.
The socialisation of minds is of paramount importance and a pre-
requisite to the new socialist state. Persuasion should be used on
a nationwide s e and c? nd in the form of m ss ideological conversio .
The close relation between ideological change and state building formed the
rationale for China's keen efforts for the massive use of communications for
persuasion purposes' particularly in the early years of the PRC.
C. Features of Persuasive Communication In the PRC
For a backward country like China in the early communist era
to reach the ideological goals through mass communications it has
to develop a unique communication system. These unique features
included a labotur-intenssive and low-cost corimunication syatem, closce
links between mass coy ication and face-to-face communication
the purposive setup of small groups in place of Ipriria group ties
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at different organisational units, and the differential use of normative,
value and emotive cormnunications.
Lacking an industrialised econonr and resources required for
capital-intensive modern communication, China has resorted to its
human resources, 78 The shortage of newsprint has been dealt with
by replacing the newspaper media with mass meetings and tatzepao
(big-character-posters). Also, without the technology and resources
that are required for transistor radios, China, turned to a system of
wired loudspeakers which opened channels to village squares, public
places, and even to the peasants' homes to reach every citizen.
Heavy reliance on mobile film projection teams is another. aapproach
which demonstrates China's use of low-cost methods to reach the
remote rural population.
Another- prominent feature is-the close link between mass
communication and face-to-face communication, Alan Liu argues that frith
the cadres acting as intermediaries between the media and oral
communications among the masses, the Communist authority could
overcome, to a certain degree, the lack of social integration- i.e.,
regionalism, lack of a common language, and a high illiteracy rate, 9
In actual practice, each mass medium is accompanied by some form of
word-of-inouthcommunica.tion to en ansuro that messages can penetrate
to those who may be technically handicaped because of the specific
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nature of the media. The newspaper reading groups swept all over
the nation in great intensity in early years of the PRC. Such
collective reading has, on one hand, magnified the penetration of
the press to the press to the resistant peasants, and on the other,
has facilitated oral agitation needed in the mass mobilisation
process. Similarly, for broadcasting, collective radio listening has
undertaken more or less the same functions as collective reading.
Institutional listening took place in factories, schools, and
government offices where wired loudspeakers were installed, and
where the employees, students, or workers were a captive audience.
In rural areas, broadcasting assemblies have been organised so that
the designated programms could reach a larger mass. Collective
listening has enabled the Party to insure that the people received
what was intended for them. In the case of films, oral explanations,
before, during and after the shows by the mobile movie projection teams
carry similar functions.
The third significant feature in the PRC lies in the set-up of the
official small study groups80. The Communists appeared to have realised
the difficulties of getting modern ideas across to people and in
persuading them to give up their traditional ways for the new ones
required by the Marxist ideology, Natural social groups such as
family, Kinship groups, friends and co-workers,characterised by
intimate face-to-face association and fundamental in forming the
ideas and influencing the behaviour of the individuals, are perceived
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the Chinese Communists as obstacles to the development of the new
Marxist ideology. Since they are normally reinforcers of
traditional norms, the Communists attempt to dislodge individuals
from these primary ties. They have tried to penetrate and control
existing groups and at the same time create new primary groups in
which to encapsulate individuals, thereby gaining control over the
norms and using them to reinforce higher demands. The ideal small
group is one in which an individual finds himself surrounded by
people who not only comply, but also enthusiastically and creatively
support higher demands., and do not compote for individunl loyalties
but are mobilised as an entire unit. Small groups of between eight
and fifteen have been organised at various orgaisational units
such as the factories, schools, mines, government offices, corrective
labor camps, military units and urban neighbourhoods. They are
formed and supervised by higher authorities, and meet on a regular
basis to engage mainly in political study and other related activities,
These small groups progressed rapidly after 1949. During the Cultural
Revolution when the political structure co7_lap ed, they atrophied
greatly, but, since then they have been resuscjtated and txtendod.
in actual practice, the smell group is the unified single
approach in different kinds of organisation. Ina country with high
rate of illiteracy and various otlinic and janguago differences, the
small groups have helped to minimised the difficulty of bringing the
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messages from the elite to the masses and as a feedback device to the
rulingelite. Standard manuals on how the small work should operate
are produced from the central. authorities. Usually, membership is by
selection and the members' oun choice. The basic idea is that natural
groups and friendship ties are to be cross-cut, and that education
and revolutionary experience should be counted as important criteria.
Group meetings are to be carried out in a. happy contradictory and
lively atmosphere with the focus on political stuchr, self--criticism
and mutual criticism, ranging from 2- 4 hours a day to 2- 4 hours
a week depending on the typo of organisational unit the groups affiliate
with.
The small groups have both successes and failures, Conclusively,
they succeeded in preventing deviance and maint 11U119 social control,
and making the mass more aware of officials goals and. demands and more
difficult to express opposition or avoid compliance. But, it failed
to transfer attitudes mainly because of the structural constraints of
the organisations which created cliff .culty in encapsulating individual,
mobilising group and maintaining effective group and its mere nature
being new and alien to the Chinese culture.
Finally., the exhaustive use of the four categories of communication.
informative., normative, val.uo-oreinted and affective, has impressed
many China observers as a unique feature in Cllincse ma.s s persuasion.
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It is closely related to the three other features mentioned earlier.
Whereas informative and value-oriented communications are manifest
more in the mass media in their dissemination of government policies
and national goals, normative and affective communications take
place in the organised' face-to-face communication and small groups.
The role of the Chinese mass media has been to deliver messages
on national development, changing policies and Marxist ideology. On
one hand, they inform the public about facts and events happening
in the country, and on the other, they try to inculcate a new set of
values and beliefs originated from the Marxist doctrine to the
traditional Chinese society. Consequently, they have enhanced the
people's knowledge of the physical and social- environments and have
imparted the expectations end desires of the new ruling elite.
No i-i ative and affective comnnznication have been used a lot in
the small groups, mass meetings and oral agitations. Despite tie
emphasis on value transmissions, the small groups define standards
of behaviour. and control deviants through their normative communications
and their strong feeling of shame generated from the emotional and
affective communications in self-criticisms and mutual-criticisms,
In mass meetings and oral agitations, emotional. -iro su u 1 and
confessions act as major appeals in persuading the mass to accept
the communist Clay.
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Chapter II
Media and Immigration: Major Theories and Hypotheses,
Camrnunication always involves two parties, the communicator
and the receiver. The communicator carries with him a set of wishes
and expectations about the content and effects of the cormunication,
while the receiver, in no way different, also possesses his own
intentions and preferences about his participation in the communicative
acts. In the first chapter, we have oxnminod the top-to-hottoin process
of how the Chinese Communists have utilised various media of
communication for mass persuasion, concluding that they have nearly
eyhausted all forms of human communications, in great intensity and
with special skills to penetrate far-reaching corners and communities.
lowever, this does not necessarily mean that the goals of the communicator
have been accomplished in the ways as desired. One key question still
remain unanswered in the Chinese case: Have the Persuasive messages
in the media been received and accepted properly by the general public?
To tackle this question involve another important area of study on
the communication process from the receiving end.
The central question to the study of media consumption is what
contributes to peoples s consumption of various media. Forty years
ago, when the hypodermic theory of communication was at its peak1
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mass media were considered all-powerful and a skilful communicator
could inject ideas or beliefs into an audience which was generally
passive and non-selective. Later studies on selective exposure,
selective perception, and the obstinate audience have changed
the audience concept to be an active information--seeking party who
can resist the influence of the communicator.2 The uses and
gratification approach has further pointed out that communication is
goal-directed behaviour and that the audiences are quite of their
on needs and mass media have to compete with other sources as means
of need gratification.3 There are other perspectives in explaining
the communication behaviour, they all converge that people's media
behaviour are complex and shaped by many factors and conditions,
In this study, we have chosen a sociological approach to explain
peoples's media selection and consumption. patterns in the PRC.
We believe that, in spite of the heterogeneity of modern society,
people of the same category, that is, with a similar location in
the social structure, will have similar folk ways. These similar
modos of orientation and behaviour will cause them to relate to such
phenomena as the mass media in a fairly uniform manner. Members of
a particular category will select or consume similar media and communicatio
communication. 4
contents. This is called the social category theory of mass
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The social category theory stems from the stratification of
society. The main proposition is that industrialisation causes a
change in the economy and transformation of related social
organisations, and these have entailed changes in occupational structures
and labour intensity, savings and investment patterns, movement of
good and services, and patterns of consumption.5 Whereas in
traditional societies, stratification is based on legal rights of
on established customs, in modern industrial societies, the stratification
system is not an institution in its own right but a by-product of
other institutions like property, education and economic structures.
There are two major perspectives in regard to the dimensions
along which people are stratified. Marx postulates that people's
positions in the social system of econor which is rooted in their
relation to the means of production is the sole criterion for social
stratification.6 In his view, there are two classes in a society,the
one which is in control of the means of production and the other lacks
such control, and that these two classes are antagonistic to each
other, one exploiting the other. This approach which conceives a
bi-class system in asociety fails to explain for the intensive
stratification which tapes place in a, complex society in its process
of modernisation and advancement.
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Weber adopts a different perspective from Marxt s. He thinks that
class, status and power are the main criteria of social stratification.?
In principle, they all are independent factors, but in actual use,
they can each be exchanged or translated into the other two. Parson
Davis and More have further expanded Webert's concepts into the
functional approach.8 This approach, with its groundings in society's
division of labour, emphasizes that the degree of functional importance
of different roles for the maintenance of the social system is the main
dimoncion for Social ptratification.Following this viow,
skills, knowledge and performance should be rewarded differently,
in terms of prestige, power and goods and services. In this way,
education and occupation become important criteria of stratification.
In fact, in many recent empirical studies, socio-economic background
such as income, occupation and education have been commonly used
indicators of social stratification.
What are the effects of stratification apart from the mainfest
strata phenonmenon? Stratification entails significant cultural
consequences. Difforent strata, as a result of their relative
isolation, develop different cultural patterns, i.e. different
subcultures. In each subcultural, there are unique value systems
life raeanings and goals, behavioural norms and most important, unique
life styles.9 Media behaviour which is an integral part of human
interactions can in no way escape these subcultural influences.
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Some previous studies show support to the relationship between
audience's social background and their media. behaviour. Runclman has
observed that the educated people had a strong preference for public
services prograinnies in television,10 while Katz in his Israel study
found that the well-educated chose reading books and magazines as
their activities after work.12 In a study on television viewing
Clarke discovered that people of lower occupational prestige
participated in watching television most frequently. 13 These are
among those many studies on how media consurption moy relate to one's
socioeconomic background.
Social stratification and Media Consumption in the PRC
How has stratification affected the media behaviour of the
general public in the PRC. This question will be discussed
in this section.
Being a communist society, in theory, China, follows the Martian
approach of stratification but in actuality, it cannot resist the
structuraa differentiation taking place in its process of moderisation
and advancement. Now let us take ra look at stratification in
contemnorarv China.
Ideally, a communist socioty is one with only one class, the
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working class. With the abolition of ownership of private property,
the class of capitalists ceases to exist, and ends the antagonistic
class structure and exploitation. To the communist regime, the
Marxdan ideal is to be observed,, but the crucial question is how far
is it practicable in the social conditions of Communist China.
Chairman Mao, after the Proletarian Revolution, started to
reconstruct the stratification structures in the society based on
division of labor, occupational evaluation and reward. 13 The ideal
hierachy of eva1uabion was proclaimed in Common Programme in 1949 a.r
follows: working class, peasantry, revolutionary armed forces,
intellectuals, petit bourgeoisie, national bourgeoisie, national
minority, overseas Chinese and other patriotic themes. Mao's
intention was not to reinstate a. class structure but to differentiate
the people from a practical stand according to their functional roles
in an egalitarian society. But, has the concept of egalitarianism
been practise effectively and eliminated inequalities among the
Chinese people?
Indeed, in the PRC, inequalities exist and have contributed
to actual social stratification. Income, political power and
educational access are the main. forms of inequalities in China.
First, under the principle that excessive egalitarianism is to be
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avoided and proper differential rewards to compensate for different
contributions to socialist construction are to be allowed., 15 income
differentials emerged in both rural and urban areas. In 1956 the
income ratio of the highest rank to the lowest for people working
in urban state enterprises such as factories, educational institutions
and government offices was about 28: 1. For rural communes
since peasants were rewarded according to their hard work by additional
work points and greater shaxe of the harvest, the ratio between the
richest and the poorest peasant was 2: 1 while tho one betreen the
richest commune and the poorest was 4: 1. l These income differentials
appeared to have dropped in the later years. In 1980, the average
worker income as compared to that of the average peasant still
maintained at a ratio of about 4: 1. 1.8 However, when compared to
the situation in the capitalistic society, these differentials in
income among the different groups are el:tremely modest.
Political power is very unequally distributed in China, As
in Robert Heilbroner' s comments:19 .... it is useful to consider
that the Chinese effort to minimise social and economic hierarchies
has taken place within a political framework whose overall hierarchical
structure is as pronounced as that of any society in history, the
Chinese Communists have placed groat emphasis on encouraging opinions
and initiative from subordinates and preserved the basic Lenin Party
Structure and democratic centralist rules of discipline. The party
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committee or branch within any orguzi sation ha, an overwhelming
dominance over the life of the orgDn1 cation and it momborsa.20
Educational skills and access is another area where inequalties
exist. Although after 1949, there was massive expansion of education,
educational opportunities remained low. While primary schooling is
appro aching universalisation, not all primary school pupils have the
chance to receive higher education. The number of enrolments at
various higher levels diminishes as one goes up the oducation ladder.
Details of the enrolment figures are shown in Table 2.1.21 Generally,
the number of students at lower-middle and upper middle schools has
gone up in the past few years. The PRC official figures also show
that there are less than two million youths, a mere 1% of the college--
age popalation, enrolled as full-time university students.2 As the
university expansion have not been able toto keep pace with lower level
education, higher education opportunities have become relatively
difficult to secure. Before the Cultural Revolution, universities
used standardised examinations to select most of their students,
although class background and political recommendations were taken
into account. Since the "Send-Down Movement" in the Cultural
Revolution, all middle school leavers were assigned to the country
for two years before they return for selection for university education.23
There is an increasing emphasis on re-introduction of entrance
examination, mass recommendation and leadership approval in university
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selection, while thequestion of who are the people suitable for
university education has always been the focus of continuing debate.
It is no doubt that social and material differentiation do exist in
the PRC. The Chinese Communists were quite aware of this and have put
vigorous and distinctive measures to check against the possibilities of
stratification. Attempts were made to mute the, consequences of the
inequalities, in terms of matters like life styles, consumption patterns
and interpersonal deferences.24 First, the elimination of ranks in the
armed force in 1965 took off the external signs and symbols of soldiers in
order to blur the differential treatment that existed in the army. Besides,
high-level officials, intellectuals, factory managers and engineers
are required to spend regular periods of time doing manual work alongside
with the workers and peasants they supervise so that they can come into
direct contact, become more appreciative of their values and problems
and less distinct as a separate and alien, elite class within society.
Similar styles of dressing and personal ways of address between superior
and subordinate also have helped minimise differences between them. Finally,
the homogenisation of consumption pattersn and life styles is enforced under
egalitarianism in the PRC. With the rationing system of food and other
consumer items controlled allocation of urban housing, differences that
exist in income, power and education do not result in as wide a
divergence in the consumption patterns of the population.
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The efforts of the Chinese Communists have no doubt minimised
the development of rigid and distinctive strata or class. In M arxl an
theory, class differed in terms of certain number of attributes
interwined with each other. The bourgeoisie enjoy a higher income.
a higher level of education and higher prestige, and on the contra
the workers have a low income, a low level of education and low
prestige. However, the process of revolutianaxy transformation in
the socialist society leads to a certain disinter ation of decomposition
of the attributes of status. The character of work the amount t of
income, the level of education and prestige tend to be disassociated.'
There are groups with low income but high prestige such as the
industrial workers or other with high income but low prestige such
as the professors. With the disintegration of these attributes, the
emergence of different classes i s utterly difficult.
To conclude on social stratification in the PRC it
appears that the Chinese society have to undergo structural
differentiation in the process of modernisation and advancement
resulting in the emergence of various social end occupational groups
or strata. Social and material differentiation that exist also tend
to bring about the formation not of social class but of non-'antag or istis
strata, inspite of China's efforts to prevent inequalities resulting
in different life styles and consumption. Therefore China can be
called a stratified society. Access to positionnr and privildge depends
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on individual dedication and political purity, but the possession of
technical knots-how is seen as an additional rising factor' in view
of the emphasis placed on technology in Chinas s modernisation and
industrali sation.
Ifaving reviewed on the phenonmena of social stratifi cation
in the- PRC9- we now turn to the relations between audiences s
social economic background and their media consumption patterns.
In China, the significant social catogoriej identified as related to
media consumption are formed along four dimensions: education, occupation
urban residence and family social class.
A. Education
in studies of western societies, education has been found by
many26 as an important factor for media. consumption and in particular.
written media. Education affects people' s leisure interest, reading
rather than viewing television is more interesting to the more-educateds.
The reason for this is that educated people possess the ability, interest
and habit in reading. Formal education has trained up those undertakers
with the Interest and taste to appreciate this written language and
the informative contents in Looks, magazines and newspapers, whereas
the universal..istic symbols and glamourous c1iarncter of television
appoars to be more appealing to the less educated as no reading
ability is required at all to compreherd the messager.28
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In China, the education institution is part of the social
system. Schools are mainly divided into four levels: primary,
lower-middle, upper.-middle and university. Despite variations in
the educations systems during different periods because of the
changing policy under different leadership, at present,Primary
schools are found in most brigades, secondary schools, however,
usually are available at commune towns or county seat.29 Upper-middle
school is still much more available in the cities where schools are
generally of higher qualities.30 Enrolment in schools is in the
increasing trend as shown in Table 2.1. Generally, education has
boon broadened after 1949 and tho goneration which grows up in the
Communist Regime appears to benefit more from formal education than
their antecedents, as illiteracy of this group is high particularly in
31
rural areas.3
If reading ability and interest account for the educateds'
proneness to written mass media, then a similar if not stronger
relation should hold for the educated Chinese. In China, the more
educated people should show tendency to involve in written media, as,
they have been trained under the formal education to read, and more
important, in the Chinese culture, study in which reading is the
central activity is are important value in itself. A review on the
form and content of the Chinese written media. shows even stronger
support to this relationship. The Chinese Press, for example, has
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often impressed the outsiders as highly informL1,ti pro and serious
written work which being formal and bookish in appearance appeal
much better to the more-educated than to the less-educated.
B. Occupation
Occupation., as a criterion of social stratification., can shape
people life-style in two way by its relation to the means of production
and by its definition of work situations which in turn affect both
t he consciousness and attitudes of the person.32 One's occupation is
his functional role in society and s!eflects the importance of one's
position for the maintenance of the society. Many western studies
have shown that occupational prestige is an important factor in the
consumption of media.33 The explanation is that people with higher
occupational prestige generally have higher aspirations and use their
leisure for activities related to their future pursuits
In the PRC, occupational status measurements are very
different from that of the western democratic societies. The more
prestigious groups include the workers, the military and the
cadres. Whereas the whita-collars, teacher and professionals are
not given as great status a s they msy have in western societioo,34
In relation to their media consumptions, there are a few speculations.
First, for the more prestigious occupational groups, the situation
may be quite similar to the western case. As promotion is related
wmore to individual dedication, political involvement arid class
background, the workers, military and the cadres, with their good
occupational status, should stand better chance in terms of advancement
in their work situations They therefore are more inclined to the
mass media which are the mouthpiece of the government In spending
time in these media activities, they can learn more about party
directives and policies, changing political situations and the Lenin
doctrine and concepts as applied in the PRC, it is expected
that they would associate themselves more with these official mass
media For the larger population of farm labourers, it is very
likely that after a day!s fatiguing work in the field, they may prefer
to spend their leisure time more in the light and entertainment media
which are mentally less demanding and relaxing Among those occupations
which require more cognitive skills at work like the office staff,
teachers and other professionals,it seems that reading may still be
the more popular leisure activity since it may be difficult for them
to disassociate work activities from leisure at home.
C. Rural — TIrbnn Rfisirlfinn
The degree of urbanisation has been found by many as a
significant variable for media consumption Damle, in his study of
India, noted that in a developing country, there is a rapid decline of
iniormation level as 0110 moves away from city, as mass media arc much
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less available outside the cities The low availability of mass medi.
• - •
in rural areas can be expected because illiteracy rapidly decreased
the market for printed media outside the city, lack of electricity
makes it hard to use electronic media, and a shaky transportation
system makes it hard to deliver anything, Lncian Pyc, in a penetrating
study of communication patterns and governmental patterns in non-Western
societies, points out that the non-Western societies have two distinct
3 6
levels of communication — The urban and the village level. Whereas
the urban centres are characterised by modern technology and mass
media, traditional media such as word-ofmouth ' and folic culture still
dominate in the rural villages. The villages and the cities do not
have anything like equal access to the same communication systems,
but, rather, two different communication systems are perpetuated.
In the PRC, despite the government efforts on narrowing
the gap between cities and villages, rural-urban differences like
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affluency and way of life still exist in a significant way, In
considering the relation between such difference and media, consumption,
apart from the city mass media availability factor which is common in
all developing countries, two other significant factors are included in
the case of China. The first concerns rural-urban income differentials.
As pointed out earlier in this chapter, the average income differential
between city and village is about 4- : 1 in 1980. Income affects one!s
media accessibility0 City people with higher income are bound to have
9better access to media economically and hence more varied choice of
media. Chen Ming has noted that the greater media access of the city
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people has enabled higher consumption of newspaper and magazines.'
In relation to this , illiteracy is another factor which explains low
consumption of written media in villages. The Chinese Communists have
tried to minimise illiteracy all over the nation, but there are far
better results in cities than in rural areas. The relatively high
illiteracy in rural China has indirectly resulted in lower consumption
X—v-p -v« -V«L 4 y-4 4 .
In sum, we speculate that in the PRC, urban people
are more likely than the rural dwellers to consume mass media, both
printed and electronic.
n T?4 1,r ri n p-1
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This factor, being unique to the Communist Chinese Society, has
some relations to the media consumption patterns of the poo pi o. Let
us first explain the meaning of family social class in the PRC
China, and then explore how it can affect media behaviour.
During the first few years and reform period under the c'ommunisl
regime, based on Mads analysis, families were grouped into different
class categories, in both rural and urban areas. In rural China, ti
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most important divisions are landlords, rich peasants, middle peasants,
poor peasants, and hired peasants and other workers. The primary
categories in cities include bureaucratic bourgeoisie (merchants whose
captials are closely tied to Kuomintang or foreign interest), national
bourgeoisie (merchants whose capitals are closely tied to Kuomintang
or foreign interest), petit bourgeoisie (teachers, law,,rers, doctors
etc), workers, and idlers and drifters.
People of disapproved class liko the Iandlords, rich peasnnts,
bureaucratic bourgeoisie etc suffered a lot in the early years of
communist ruled They are purged in mass political campaigns, and are
under "control", which means that they are deprived of political rights
restricted on special areas, and have to report constantly on their
reform, and in addition, they are discriminated against in various
ways: e.g. ineligible for welfare assistance, medical benefits and
loans from the credit-cooperatives. 41 Hore important still, the
stigma passes on to a considerable extent to their descendants.
Offsprings from "bad Class" families are in disadvantaged positions: 42
they will be. unlikely to be able to join the Youth League, the basic
militia and local cadre posts, and h-8.ve difficulty getting into
upper-middle schools and universities, and be given fewer work points.
Although there are variations l the treatments of various bad class
families from village to village and from r ral to urban areas,
policies dealing j rith the future of class struggle and the need to
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favour former workers and poor and lower-middle peasants seem to
produce a situation in which the stigma of family origin is almost
automatic.43
It is speculated that the younger generation of the socially,
disapproved families (i.e, bad classes) which is grown up under
various discriminations are bound to be less accepting and more
apathetic and distrusting to the government. They on the whole
should demonstrate less affiliation with the official mass media
and rely Moro on tlio Personal communications for Information and
facts.
To sum up, the Chinese people's reception and selection of
media appear to relate to their different social categories. In
this section, it is found that their Media, consumption are related to
their education, occupation their place of residence and their family
social class. In this study, we are going to put these speculations
to test through empirical study of illegal immigrants from
China, and hope to throw light on how the media are received by
the people of different so:cial categories in the Communist Chincso
Society.
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Social and cultural variables have be or recognised by social
scientists as playing an important part in the way people adopt new
ideds and behaviour. Existing theories of persuasion and adoption
of innovation regard them as obstacles to effective persuasion and
change, Defleur has further examined the role of these variables
and postulated the socio-cultural model of. per suasion, His basic
assumption is that individuals almost act within a social context
from which they gain definitions of appropriate behaviour. Messages
from the communicator are not immediately accepted when they impinge
on the individuals, thev will be discussed and interpreted in the
individual's social groups which provide share definitions of
realities and approvals of objects and situations. This means,
before the individuals make decisions about their behaviour, they
usually go through a socio-cultural process in which realities are
interpreted, defined and validated by their social groups. Group
interpretations and approvals are needed by individuals to change
behavior ally as any deviance or non-compliance may bring a set of
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sorial sanctions and punishments0 Defleur further asserts that
if the communicator use the mass media to provide messages that are
new and seemingly group-supported interpretations of some phenomenon,
it is very likely that the audience will derive appropriate behaviour
from these suggested interpretations from the mass media. By so
doing, the communicator have indirectly mediated the conduct of the
»audience. And, this is an effective way of persuasion based on the
concept of socio-cultural process.
What about the case of the illegal immigrants from China? What
kinds of socio-cultural processes did they undertake before they
decide to make their way to Hong Kong? Or, what is the persuasion
process underlying their illegal immigration? And, what is the role
of media in this process of decision making? All these questions
are to be considered in the following discussion.
The central concern is the involvement of communications in the
immigrantsf process of learning and choosing Hong Kong as their future
place of residence. All media play a basic informative function to
their users. Most of the immigrants are those who have no direct
access to the realities in Hong Kong, They must rely on either the
mass media or some other forms of communication or both to construct
some sort of image about the situation and life in Hong Kong,
In the £RC, information about Hong Kong can be obtained from a
number of varied sources. First, official publications such as books,
magazines and newspapers do tell the Chinese people a little bit about
the conditions in Hong Kong, A recent study of the Southern Daily shows
that in 1979 -1920 there are totally 10o news stories covering or
i £
mentioning facts and events in Hong Kong, Cecond, in China,
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from the Hong Kong broadcast stations and hence the Chinese people con
watch or listen to the visual images and voices directly from Hong
Kong. This is particularly true to those who live near to the
border, like some of the rural villages in the Guangdong province.
Apart from these media, personal contacts, direct or written, with
friends and relatives appear to be another possible channel by which
the Chinese acquire more understanding about Hong Kong. The open
door policy of China during these few years have facilitated visitors
to travel to various provinces whereby information about Hong Kong
and foreign countries spread to the most remote corners through
4-7
interpersonal communication networks. Among the various sources,
people tend to rely more on personal sources as the informations
from official channels appear to be less trustworthy for the
governments intent to prevent further immigration and to condemn.
Hong Kong for the evils of a canit alls lie society.
With information corning from different sources, inconsistence
and contradictions are bound to occur as every communicator is a
gagekeeper by himself. How did the Chinese immigrants sort out thoj
true from untrue? Defleur's theory can explain the people's
behaviour in relation to this. Following the socio~cultutal model,
individuals who do not have access to the realities will normally
react to incoming messages about these realities by seeking the
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kind of consensus about these realities. Therefore, the immigrants
are expected to validate their information with their primary social
groups and gradually a group-supported image of Hong Kong is
constructed. Assuming that the immigrants act in a rational way, it
is very likely that they have a favourable image about the conditions
and life in Hong Kong, And, more important, if their realities are
socially constructed by their significant primary groups, it is also
likely that immigrants of different social categories ma; have vaiyiii
imnaee of Rrmp1 Krmrr
A favourable image of Hong Kong alone cannot account for the
immigrants1 move if they faced disapprovals from their social groups.
Therefore, it is expected that the immigrants, after the group
process of reality definition about Hong Kong would also seek the
groups1 interpretations about the appropriateness of the immigration
act. With support and approval from their groups, their degree of
determination to take over action on the immigration is strengthened.
Here, it appears to be reasonable to assert that both a favourable
image of Hong Kong and the presence of group approval affect the
immigrants1 determination to go across the border to Hong. Kong,
3o far, we have discussed the possible relations between 1
immigrants1 use of media and communications and their decision I
immigrate in the context of a persuasion process. However, there
are other factors which map go parallel if not more significant to
the illegal immigration. Now, let us take a look, at the general
situation about overseas immigration from China and delineate the
other significant factors which map go side bp side with the influence
of the media, in the immigrantsT decision-making process.
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Zwingraann, in his study of the problem of uprooting, distinguished
g
seven major types of motivations for the move. They are classified
as follows: physical: e.g. war or natural calamities like earthquakes,
droughts, famine, floods, climate, etc.; economic: e.g. underemployment,
low material living standards, absence of social security, move ordered
by government; social: family trouble, housing, and occupational
difficulties - future of children, attraction by relatives of friends
already move; psychological: personal conflict, escapism, restlessness,
difficulties of adjustment to existing societies, transcultural
interest, sense of adventures; religious: religious intolerance;
political: discrimination lack of freedom, professional: e.g. inadequate
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These motivations come from the conflict situations which
are cither caused by external circumstances and pressure or by inne:
psychological factors resulting from the personality structure of
the individual Whether the immigration is a personal matter or a
social issue depends on both the size and the effect of the move
Zwingmann has noted that there are few nations where population
movements do not occur and that these migratory movements are
fraught with issues of vital political, economic and social concern.
Overseas Chinese immigrants spread over more than fifty nations.
Their immigration are closely related to both historical and
Q
geographical factors. Chen Ta has discovered that when foreign
trade has started in China and the Govern em cnt lias little control on
emigration, residents at seaport areas began to move overseas.
However, these historical and geographical factors are the
facilitating factors only, they alone cannot explain the immigration
From his study, Chen Ta derived several reasons for their immigration
as listed in Table 2.2. Among the reasons, economic pressures and:family tie
are the most important and account for more than 88% of the cases.
Regarding the first reason — economic pressure — it can be broadly
divided into two areas, individual and family. A person can emigrate
because he or she is unemployed or has difficulty in finding a job
and wishes to malic a fortune overseas. More than 40% of the cases
falls into this category, mother 30% emigrates for the sate of
improving the economic situation of their family which are big in
size but small in income. The second important reason is their family tj
or social ties with the people of the .country where they immigrate.
wThese connections;open up tho change of employment, end helped paved
the way of immigration. About 20% of the cases come because of these
ties. The remaining ones are those who move because of natural
disasters, social disapproval, instability of residence and family
disharmony. They only constitute around 12%.





























In a recent study, it is found that the province of Guangdong
is most distinctive in its large emigration to places overseas, which
took place particularly from mid-nineteenth century onwards. Over
half of all Chinese who went abroad came from the two main counties,
Fei-xian and Tai-shan of Guangdong. These immigrants started to send
remittances back in the 1950s when the government encouraged the inflo
of foreign dollars.
To conclude, it appears that family factor is significant for
the immigration. On one hand, family ties overseas explain the
emigration, and on the other, to improve family's quality of life
as demonstrated by the constant remittances from overseas also
signifies some of the underlying motivations for overseas immigration.
In the next few pages, we are going to explore on how family may have
affected the illegal immigration from China into Hong Kong in these
few years.
Familv Ties and their Significance in the Til oral Tmmiaration
In the Confucian society of traditional China, family had been
regarded as the very core of social structure. In a broad sense,
traditional Chinese families did not limit itself only to the household
with the parents and their children, they extended to those blood
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ties whom they called kinsmen. The Confucian ethics have stressed
the importance of the family relationships; out of the Five Human
Relationships (wu-lu), family relationship occupied three. Parents1
absolute authority, supremacy of seniors and loyalty to the family
are not only values embedded strongly in the Chinese culture, but
also are acknowledged fully by the states through legal institutions.
M.C. Yang even related famflism to the Chinese national Charater. He
postulated that filial piety Is a. basic ingredient of the Chinese
Character. The attributes of filial piety include to continue
biological life, cultural life and to carry out the parents' will.
When the Chinese Communists come to power in 194-9, Confucien
ethics have given way to communist ideology which stresses that
loyalty has to have one focus — the party. As pointed out by
C.K. Yang, the Communists are fully aware of the imcompatibility
f
between a socialist society and the kinship-oriented traditional
5
Chinese society. They have put great efforts in the form of
propaganda, indoctrination and mass campaigns to broaden the minds
of the people from the narrow confine of their family and. kinship
to the wider society. However, tho dominant policy of tho Chinono
Communists is not to abolish the family as an institution but to
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limit its size and function, ' and that family commitments should
not interfere with those of the state. It is apparent that the laws
did not aim at a destruction of the family, although it did remove
features which blostered traditional family and subordination of the
individuals. The traditional emphasis of absolute power of the older
generation and the absolute obedience of the younger generation are
supposed to be replaced by concern and care in both sides. The officiz
views seem to be that when there are conflicts between parents and
the state, the children ore expected to criticise and even expose them
to the government.
The Communists have also tried to weaken the individuals1
loyalties towards their families and kinships through other change:
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in the countiy. The education system, previously under the realm
of the family, is now in the hands of the state, with its curriculum
stressing the communist ideology instead of the Confucian ethics.
Mass organisations of political, social and economic activities have
directed the attention of the individuals from family and kinship to
the community. By propaganda, education and mass political campaigns
like the Five-Anti Campaigns, the visions of the people are widened
beyond the complex and extensive web of family and kinship ties.
There is no definite answer as to the success of the Communists1
family policies. However, one can assert with considerable confidence
that deep-rooted values and attitudes are very difficult to bo changed,
from the findings of social science researches on persuasion. For
example, the resistance of the people to change their traditional
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practices is still strong in rural China. Therefore, it appears
that the family concept of the younger generation may be weaker than
that of the old, but it is in no way totally eliminated.
In considering the family factor in immigration behaviour, it i
important .to distinguish between the push and the pull factor.
Whereas the push factor drives the individual to emigrate, the pull
factor holds the individual back to the mother country. Whether the
family is a push of a pull factor depends on several attributes:
family cohesion in China, family ties in Hong Kong, the urge for
family reunion, the individual's sense of family importance, and his
desire to improve the family's standard of living. It is expected
that the stronger the push factor, the greater the immigrant's
determination'to leave China. In contemporary China- in view of
-J. 1 J
the declining family cohesion, the general low standard of living
and the family ties that exist between the Chinese people and the
residents of Hong Kong, it is very likely that the push factor wins
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After reviewing on the major theories on media and immigratio]
behaviour, several hypotheses are formulated they are listed as
a T, yi r , 4-
1• Immigrants of different social categories have different
m or! i n a.on siirnrvM on rmt.f. pm o
la. The more-educated are more likely than the less-educate
to consume written mass media.
lb. Urban residents are more likely than rural dweller to
consume both written and electronic mass media.
1c. The Socially Approved Class (Reds) are more likely than
the Socially Disapproved Class (flacks) to consume
o O • • 1 1 •
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- Peasants are least likely among all groups to consume
written mass media.
- Workers generally have high consumption of official media.
« Professionals consume more written media than other groups.
2. Degree of control in media exposure correlates positive!;
with media consumption frequency for different groups of
• »
Official media are generally less trustworthy than personal
communications in a totalitarian society
0 Tmmi prata nri in Ilnn.o- KnriL !.. , , , , ,j I , , „ J 1
1. Immigrants rely more on personal sources than mass media
for information about objects they have no direct access
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2. Immigrants rely more on direct personal communications for
reality validation about objects they have no direct access.
3. The media images of Hong Kong portrayed by the Chinese
authorities is different from the immigrants' perceived
realities of Honer Kong-
4. Favorable image of Hong Kong correlates positively with
the .immigrants' strength of determination for immigra.tio
5« Group approval correlates positively with the immigrants1
.qtrp.ncr+.h rtT rl ftt.prmi n nf.i rm f ot ' i mnH,crrnh:] nr. -
6, Family push factor correlates positively with the immigrants1
strength of determination for immigration.
These hypotheses are mainly derived from literature review.
They will be tested empirically through data obtained from direct
interviews with the illegal immigration. But, before we proceed to
the research design, it is important to examine the general situation
of the illegal immigrant population in Hong Kong, so as to gain some
basic idea about the group of peonle under research.
T 1 1 T mw A ~ T7-v,
Hong Kong has always faced a problem of people. For the past
110 years, it has provided shelter, either temporary or permanent,
to those who for a variety of reasons have entered its confined area.
For a community which is established as well as overcrowded, Hong Kong
began to suffer from the continuing waves of immigration, the majority
of which illegal. In 1980, the estimated population of Ilong Kong was
5,067,900, with more than 4-60,000 (just less than 10$) as immigrants
who have entered Hong Kong from China, since the beginning of 1970.
According to Government statistics, the estimated number of
illegals avoiding interception in the border area and entering Hong
Kong remained at a relatively low level, until 1977 The number 01
illegal entrants then rose rapidly, climbing to an all-time high of
102,000 in 1979. The annual figures are listed in Table 2.3.
Table 2,3 Number of Illegal Entrants from China 1975 - 1920
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China into Hong Kong: Am Information Paper,
Hong Kong Government Secretariat, 1980
The Illegal immigrant population has several unique
characteristics. First, it is young. Immigrants in the 17 — 30
age group account for an overwhelming majority of illegals at o7% —
with a full 555 of that group falling in the 17 — 21 age bracket.
Only 6% are under 16 and less 2% are over 41. Second, most of them
are single, about 15% married. Further, more than 75% of the illegals
are male. A fourth and more important characteristic is that their
level of occupational skills or training is low, students and farm
labourers make up the great majority. Table 2 shows the distribution
of the occupation groups among the illegal immigrants. Regarding
education level, less than 1 % of' the immigrants had completed technical
or university-level education, 43% have finished their upper high
school study and another 43% having completed their junior high school.
Finally, around 79% of the illegals were rural-dwellers, while only
9% came from cities in China. Another 12% were city people who had
been moved to villages before making their way to Hong Kong — they are
theIntellectual Youths assigned to work in the countryside.
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Hong Kong Government Secretariat, 1980.
Both the Government source end the other surveys show that
the illegals are related to the residents of Hong Kong. Over
90% of them have some contact individual in Hong Kong - immediate or
distant relatives or friends. Apart from these social ties, it is
widely considered that the vast majority of those entering Hong Kong
illegally are attracted by the promise of the !bright lights as
represented by the visible signs of Hong KongTs economic success
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and higher standard of living. Ho illegal immigrant can reasonably
claim that he is fleeing political, religious or other persecutions.
To summarise, the illegal immigrants from China are a group of
overwhelmingly young, male Chinese who ewe with low occupational
skills, but have high hopes on their future life in Hong Kong
before they actually make their way to immigrate.
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Chapter III
Research Design- Interviews with the Immirants
Sampling Method
As the focus of the analysis is on the comparision of the various
subgroups of Immigrants, the most efficient sample is one which has a
nearly equal number of cases in each of the subcategories, the social
category variables as listed in the hypotheses. Therefore, stratified
sampling was adopted in this study. The minimun number of cases was
expected to be fifty, resulting in a total sample size of 250- 300.
Source of Interviewees
In Hong Kong, it is rather difficult to locate the illegal
immigrants as there is no central place where they can be reached for
academic researchers. Before November 1980, when new legislation on
the illegal immigrants was set, the queuing line at the Hong Kong
Immigration Department Office had been the major source of contact
with these immigrants. After the legislation on the repatriation of
all immigrants entering Hong Kong from China became effective, there
was practically no main channel where these immigrants can be found.
However, there are still a number of ways to get in touch with
the illegal immigrants. In this study, five contact points have been
used. They include the squatter communities where the immigrants reside.
the adult educational centres where they study after work, the welfare
organizations which provide social services to them, and the Wanderers
Association which is an organization formed by a group of illegal
immigrants with the purpose of fighting for recognition and rights in
Hong Kong. The researcher has also tried to find immigrants through
her personal friends and relatives who have close links with them.
The use of these various sources has at least avoided any systematic
bias which may be introduced by one particular source.
Before the actual interview, the researcher liaised closely with
the co-ordinating persons of the above-mentioned contact sources.
Information on the potential interviewees were gathered, and from them,
the researcher sorted out those who met the set criteria. Apart from
fitting the quota required for the sample, several other requirements
have been set for the interviewees. First, they must be those who were
born or grew up in the Communist Regime (i.e. after 1949). This is to
make the interviewees a more homogeneous 'group which is socialised in
the Communist social systems. Second, the interviewees should be those
who came to Hong Kong in the past four years. They would still have
relatively fresh memories of their life in Communist China. Third,
the ability to understand Cantonese or Mandarin had to be considered,
as these two languages are the main dialects used in the interview.
Language difficulties may create a lot of misunderstanding and confusion
in the interviewing process. Fourth, voluntary participation on the
part of the interviewees is another criterion. It is very likely that
«interviewees who have low interest and motivation would produce faulty
and superficial information which would affect both the reliability and
validitv of the findings
Autual interviews took place in March and April 1931 They were held
in various places including the immigrants1 homes, interviewing rooms
of the educational centres, offices of the welfare organizations and
the sitting room of the Wanderers1 Association.
The Interview
The interview was a structured one, guided by a fixed-type questionnaire
which was formulated mainly from the theoretical framework of the study.
It consisted of six major topic areas including background information
of the interviewees, their family situations, media consumption frequency
and credibility ratings, their sources and responses to information about
Hong Kong and the key factors affecting their decision to immigrate.
Whereas most of the questions are fixed-answer type, depending on the
nature of the question, some are open-ended ones which need probing on
the part of the interviewers.
Before the questionnaire was finalised, a pretest was made with
ten interviex-zees, and a number of modifications xzere made. They
include changes in the use of words and terms more appropriate to
the Chinese communist culture, addition of new response categories,
and the simplification of a .few difficult questions. The main
%
modification lay in the five-point scale of credibility ratings. As
it was found that there was a very strong tendency to check the middle
point of the scale, the researcher amended the scale to a four-point
scale so that the interviewees had to take either a positive or negative
stand on media, credibilities. Those who really could not make a sound
judgement would then shift to TNo Opinion category.
The final questionnaire has eight pages, with the questions organised
under the six topic areas. It is enclosed in the Appendix of this paper.
The questions have been carefully checked to match with the variables
under study and details of how they are associated are listed in
Table 3.1
i
Interviewers were five Sociology graduates with at least two years
of research and interviewing experience. The researcher held four
training and orientation sessions with them in which theoreretical
background and hypotheses were explained, each question was discussed
in great detail, and their roles and techniques of probing were clearly
introduced. During the interviewing period, constant evaluation meetings
were organized to discuss difficulties and problems related to the
questionnaire, and interesting findings and cases located.
Table 3.1 Questions on the Variables under Study
Question Variable
I 1-11 Personal data: year of arrival, sex, age,
original home of family, place of residence,













TIT im - 7hA
8(i), 9(i)f 10
l(ib) - 5(ib), 6(ic)
Media Consumption Frequency: newspaper, magazine,
wired broadcasting, radio, television, film,
and folk media
Interpersonal Communication Froquency: small
group meetings, political campaign meeting,
family communication, chatting with relatives,
chatting with friends, chatting with co-workers
Media Access and Control: newspaper, magazine,
wired broadcasting, radio, television, and films
IV l(ii) - 7(ii)
8(ii) - 9(ii), 12(a~d)
Media Credibility Ratings: newspaper, magazine,
wired broadcasting, national radio, foreign radio,
national television, hong Kong television,
national films, foreign films
Interpersonal Communication Credibility Ratings:
small groups, political campaigns, family members,









Sources of•Information about Hong Kong
Most Frequently used Source
Least Frequently used Source
Most Reliable Source
Most Unreliable Source
Degree of Inconsistency among the information on UP
Responses to Inconsistencies










Family members or Relatives immigrating to
countries other than Hong Kong
Family and Relatives in'Hong Kong
Reasons for Leaving China
Reasons for Choosing Hong Kong
Attractive aspects of Hong Kong
Frimary groups consulted, influenced approved
decision
Strength of Determination
Perceived Degree of Difficulty
Number of Attempts of Illegal Immigration
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The actual interviews took place mainly in the evenings and
weekends. Before asking questions, the interviewers spent some time
explaining to the interviewees the purpose of the study, requesting them
to tell their personal experiences honestly and sincerely while assuring
them of confidentiality. As most of the interviewees were introduced
by the co-ordinating persons who had good trust in this academic research,
they were generally quite cooperative and showed little suspicion and
fear about their participation in the interview. Interviews were
individual or in a small groups, depending on the choice of the
interviewees. Normally, the interviewers went over question by question
with them, and filled in the answers one by one, and the whole interview
usually lasted for forty.-five minutes to an hour.
Apart from these structured interviews, the researcher herself
has also conducted about thirty in-depth interviews with selected
interviewees. The purpose of these long interviews is to gather some
elaboration and explanation on the immigrantst behaviour so as to
substantiate the analysis of the main findings in the questionnaire.
All these interviews were taken in a more non-directive form and with
the major focus on the whys and hows of media behaviour and the decision
for the illegal immigration. Such interviews ranged from one to three
hours.
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Results of the Interviews
There were totally 267 completed questionnaires. The researcher
screened over all of them and sorted out 236 valid cases. The unselected
ones included mainly those with incomplete replies, inconsistent answers,
a number of unqualified immigrants and a few legal immigrants.
The sources of these valid cases were quite varied, coming from the
five different contact points. Table 3.2 shows the distribution of
the interviewees with regard to their contact source. Since the
distribution is quite even, any bias which is tied to one particular
contact source should not appear systematically all through the interviews.
Table 3.2 Distribution of Interviewees in different Contact Sources
Contact Source No, of Respondents
Wandororo' Association
32 (13.6%)










The information about the background variablos of the sample are
tabled under Table 3.3- Table 3.9. With regard to the year of arrival,
52.5% of the sample arrived in 1979. This can be explained by the fact
that 1979 is the year when the greatest number of immigrants fled into
Hong Kong because of loose internal control in Communist China. More
important, over 981 of the sample arrived in Hong Kong from 1978-1980.
This means that the majority of the interviewees should recall quite
well life in China.
The sample is composed of a. rather young group of predominantly
male immigrants. Table 3.4 shows that 68.6% axe males, and the age
group from 15-25 constitutes over 83% (Table 3.5). Both the sex and
age profile of the sample looks quite close to that of the total
immigrant, population in Hong Kong as indicated earlier in Chapter Two.
Concerning residence, nearly 80% come from the Province of Guangdong,
which is the nearest province to Hong Kong. The non-Quangdong interviewees
come from the northern provinces scatteredly., with quite a few from the
Fujian Province. About half of the sample are rural residents, the
remaining portion distributed rather evenly in small towns and big cities
(Table 3.6). This is probably the result of the researcherts effort of
fitting the quota.
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Filling in the quota has also resulted rather close percentages
among the three levels of education (Table 3«8) For occupation groups,
worker, peasant, student constitute comparable proportions, whereas
professionals are only mainly because of inaccessibility of such type
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Our choice of statistical measures is mainly baoed on the nature
of the research sample and the date. Our sample, as indicated earlier,
is reasonably close to government figures on the entire immigrant
population, but it is not a random sample because it is practically
impossible to get one in the local research setting. As regard to
our data, most of them are rank-ordered while some arc nominal. The
fact that our sample being non-random and data being ordinal has
alerted us to the use of nonparametric statistical. measures.
In actual statistical analysis, we have compared parametric
and non-parametric measures on the variables under test and found
few indications of serious distortions. However, we still stick to
non-parametric measures where possible. In relation to our hypotheses
under test, correlation and partial correlation coefficients are most
useful for the analysis. The Kendall correlation coefficient is
chosen for all instances because it is more appropriate to our
data which generally lie in a relatively small number of categories,
each with a fairly large number of cases.
Chapter IV
Research Findings, Analysis and Conclusion
Research Findings and Analysis
A. Media Consumption
General Patterns
As discussed earlier in this paper, the Chinese Communists have
intended to spread the various mass media to far-reaching corners of
the country through a number of interpersonal devices so as to
achieve their political objectives. The official data and reports
have shoved the efforts as veil as expectations of the Communists.
However, onevould also like to know whether their efforts have been
materialised in the vay they desired and vith the expected outcomes.
An analysis of the consumption of mass media of immigrants from China
may help to make the situation clearer.
In regard to newspapers, despite_ the fact the 70' of the sample
either sometimes or alvays read newspapers, there is still 1 1.If' who
never read newspapers (Table 1.1). Out of the newspaper readers,
63 •5% have their own copies, while nearly OO'l read the newspapers
collectively in groups organised by the government (Table 1.1).
These figures indicate that newspaper have become quite common, and
collective reading still exists as an organised form of facc-to-face
communication bv which official messages from newspapers can getC L_ - X w
Table U 1 Media Consumption Frequency
Media Consumption Freauencr
Media Nevar Ooonq.qi nnnl 1 v Snrnphi m=»q Alunv.q Tnt.n






















































































across to people of different ethnic and cultural background. However,
they also reflect that the Chinese Communists are not totally
successful in penetrating to the entire population, as there is still
a significant portion of those who are out-of-the-reach of the official
newspapers
Magazines seem to be less well-received as compared to the press. About
34° of the interviewees said that they never read magazines and only
11.1 % claimed that they were constant magazine readers (Table 4.1) •
Around half of the magazine readers purchase their own magazine copy,
and practically none of them has been involved in collective reading
of magazines.
The relative low attendance to magazines can be explained by
a few factors. First, it is concerned with the problem of supply,
as one official report has noted that Liic total printing copies of the
Chinese magazines in 197B was 76'! million which means not oven one
copy per person in the whole year.1 Cccond, magazines arc generally
concerned with more specialised areas of knowledge and with specific
reader groups, and therefore attract less attention for coercion in
mass exposure in the form of collective reading. Overall, magazine
reading docs not seem to be very common in China as indicated from
the responses of immigrants.
Broadcasting, as shown from the data, is still quite popular
in China. For wired loudspealeers, over 704 of the interviewees have
attended to them at a moderate level or more (Table 4.1) and only
9.3% have never been exposed to these loudspeakers. More important,
75.7o of the listeners heard the broadcast from organised broadcast
assemblies or at work places, with about 23.4% had the loudspeakers
connected to their home (Table 41) All these confirm that wired
broadcasting is quite penetrating; only a. rather small portion of the
people can escape from it. They also point out the prevalence of
collective listening to the government1s messages in China.
For radio listening, the situation is somewhat different.
About 244 of the sample'said that they have never listened to radio
before, but over 654 were constant listeners and out of them nearly
904 have their own radio sets. Collective listening to radio does not
seem to exist. The different figures demonstrate that radio sets may
still be lacking in some areas, and possibly that there is a moderate
portion of the Chinese people who have never hoard voices from foreignX -i. x. -
countries.
Film consumption as reported bv the interviewees is generally
consistent with the official figures. Only 3.44 of the sample has never
Vat died no vies-and around 754 arc constant mo vie-watchers (Table 4.1).
The majority either vent to cinemas or attended to mobile projection
teams. Both sources appear to be quite common The data also show
that as compared to the other mass media, films have been most
successfully in reaching nearly the majority of the Chinese people.
Television, which is the newest mass medium,, seems to be less
common as compared to others Around 31% of the sample claimed not
to have watched television before in China (Table 41)« And, out of
the 22% frequent viewers, about 40% possess their own television sets
(Table 4.4), which means that less than 10j of the interviewees own
television sets This implies that television, as a new technology,
is still not very widely adopted in th® PRC, and television
viewing does not seem to be a popular pastime as it is in western and
industrial societies.
Small groups appear to be losing-their dominance, as reported
by the interviewees Less than 10r% of the sample always attend
group meetings, and about 65% report low participation in small groups
(Table 4.2) Most of the groups are organised at work places or in
schools. For those who join group meetings at a moderate level or
above, less than 20% show active involvement and commitment in group
discussions mid affairs. These at least reflect that the small groups
are not at all commonly practised, and that they in turn can no longer
replace the primary groups of the people. The frequency of
interpersonal communication with family members, friends and co-uorkco
outnumbered that of the small frroun (Table L.21.
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Before analysing the findings on social category variables and
media consumption, we first take a look at the inter-relationships
between the three variables. Table 1.3 shows how the social category
variables correlate with one another. Since the inter-correlation
coefficients are not high (all fall below 0.3), we can assort with
confidence that these variables are different and unique variables,
each relates independently to the other variables under test.
Table A.¬ Kendall Correlation Coefficients: Education, Urban
Residence and Family Social Class
Education
Urban Residence
TCrhm.n+.-i nr TTrhnri T? p.rui rl on n
0.3013
(S.L.' = 0.001'






The partial correlation of education with the frequency of
newspaper reading was found to be 0.32 and 0.29 respectively (Table A. A).
This supports our hypothesis that the more-educated are more likely
than the less-educated to consume written mass media. In regard to
newspaper, it is found that the regional papers are most popular while
the People1s Daily and the Reference Hews rank next.
linen asked about why they read, the common answer, particularly
i
in the more-educated group, is that they wont to be informed about the
moves of party, events in the country and also the international scone.
The 1ess-educated have remarked that they prefer to know but did not
insist that to be informed is very important.
It seems that apart from the reading behaviour, another new
factor of the urge for news and information accounts for the greater
consumption of newspaper. Education has not only trained up one1su. o. w C -J-
reading habit, brut also oneT s interest and aptitude to learn about
the environment and the world, Ithiel De Sola Pool has noted the
phenomena of the hunger for news and information for the people in a
totalitarian society. From the interviewees1 self-reports, we observ
that education may possibly correlate with one!s urge for news and
information and this further explain the higher consumption of
newspaper for the more-educated.
For magazines, the situation is quite similar. The choice
of magazines is found to vary according to oneTs leisure interest
as well as his work. People show some tendency to read magazines whicl
are related to their work, for example, among the interviewees, the
technician prefers to read magazines on science and technology,
whereas an art designer reads quite a number of magazines on art and
design. And, people who have leisure interest in special areas
such as literature and photography also tend to read magazines on
these special areas. But their choices do not explain the high
consumption of magazines. Like reading newspaper, many of the magazim
readers told us that they read because they want to increase their
knowledge on some special, areas, again, their concern for knowledge
seems to be important to their magazine reading.
Table 4.4 Kendall Partial Correlation Coefficients: Social category-
variables and media consumption frequency
m red





































Controlling for sex, age, marital status, urban residence, family
social class, and province.
Controlling for sex, age, marital status, education, family social
class and province.
Controlling for sex, age, marital status, urban residence, education
and orovince-
Note: the figures inside the brackets are the level of significance.
Hypothesis 1.b
Partial correlation coefficient of urban residence with newspaper
reading, magaxine reading, listening to.wired broadcasting, radio
listening, watching television and movie-going was found to be 0.2,
0.25, -0.2, 0.05, 0.23 and 0.18 respectively (Table 4.4). These
results support partly our hypothesis that urban residence correlates
positively with both written and electronic media. The relatively
stronger association among the variables under test are those between
urban residence — magazine reading and urban residence —- watching
television. The reason for this as indicated earlier in this paper.
is media availability. Many of the interviewees remarked that in
their villages, the supply of magazines is quite scarce, and there is
only very limited choice. The Red blag, the Youth of China and Mom en
of China are the more common ones available'other periodicals on more9 a.
specialised areas are practically not found in the remote villages.
The big city, being a commercial, industrial and distribution centre,
has greater supplies of magazines. Therefore, media availability may
explain at least partly the correlation between urban residence and
magazine reading.
In the case of television, the relatively lower consumption
in the rural villages, according to the interviewees1 reports, are
due to technological as well as geographical reasons. Quite a number
of them who resided at distant villages said that as there is limited
electricity supply, even if they have television sets, access to
i
electricity has limited their chance of watching television. For
many others, the case is that they simply cannot receive the messages
from the broadcast stations either because of distance or the hilly
environment. Presence of television sets very often does not mean
television-watching. Comparatively speaking, these factors are nearly
non-existent in the urbanised areas.
The partial correlations between residence and newspaper reading,
and mo vie-watching are a bit weaker as compared with those with
magazine reading and television-viewing. This perhaps reflects that
the rural and urban difference is less dominant for these two types
of media consumption. ' The difference again may evidence the different
degrees of penetration of these two media in rural areas.
The negative relation found between listening wired broadcasting
and urban residence appears to support the predominance of wired-
loud speakers in rural areas, which is the intent of the Chinese Communists,
In fact, most of the interviewees from villages reckoned that wired-
loudspeakers are quite common in the public open space and gathering
places. As for radio listening, the results show that there is no
significant relation between residence and this variable. This at
least hints that the radio is not monopolised by the city people.
Many of the rural dwellers possess transistor radios and casettes
brought back by their relatives and friends from Hong Kong.
Hypothesis 1.c
In regard to family social class, its partial correlation
with newspaper reading, magazine reading, listening to wired broadcasting,
radio-listening, television viewing and movie watching was found to
bo 0.16, 0.11, O.H'1, -0.10, -0. IV, 0.13 respectively (Table A.A) •
The relatively weak association between family class origin and the
consumption of official media like newspaper, magazine ondwired-
broadcasting con bo explained by the following general phenomenon.
Most of them from Black families have rather mixed feelings towards
the official media. On one hand, they are suite scornful and
rejecting towards anything from the official sources, but on the other,
they want to know what the party is thinking, and have to rely on the
mass media for such information. Therefore, they consume the mass
media just like what the Reds do in order to survive in the society
where they are discriminated against. For this reason, wo cannot
find significant correlations between the family social class and
these official mass media.
However, the case is quite different for radio and television,
mainly because these are the media by which foreign information can
flow in directly from the communicator without any interference from
the Chinese Communists. The negative- correlations, though not very
strong, still supports that the Blacks are more active than Reds in
reception to radio and television. Quite a number of the interviewees
from the Black class told us that they listened a lot to foreign
broadcasts such as those from Hong Kong, the BBC, the VOA, USS.R,
Taipei, and Vietnam, The socially disapproved class in the PRC
seems to have even greater hunger for news from foreign countries than
the approved class.
Hypothesis 1 .d
Since the occupational groups are nominal categories, we have
chosen the lambda measures to analyse the association between this
variable and media consumption (Table 45).
j
The strongest associations appear to fall in the categories of
print media — newspaper and magazines, with lambda values being
0.24 and 0.23 respectively. This suggests that different occupation
groups may have different consumption frequency of those two mass
media. Table 4«5 also reflects that as compared other groups,
the professionals show the greatest affiliation to newspaper and
magazine (over 75% read then frequently), and peasants are least
likely among all groups to consume the written media (over 58% of them,
seldom read the media). When asked about why, some of the professionals
reported that they liked reading and reading habits have been developed long
ago ana others thought that they needed to -read to upkeep
their knowledge about special areas related to their work, this is
particularly true in explaining their favour to magazines. On the
contrary, the peasants expressed dislike to reading because they
would be too tired to involve in such demanding mental work after a
day's heavy manual work in the field. They preferred to spend
leisure in a more relaxed manner, in the form of chatting and
ent or t ai nrn en t.
For the workers, we find that they show a rather consistent
inclination to official media. Over 50% of the interviewees of worker
background were frequent attendants to the official media (Table 4.5).
The group told us that they spent time in media exposure because they
could learn a lot from the media. Information such as changing policies,
special knowledge, national technological advancement and foreign
relations are very useful for their future prospects. They believe
that they need to equip themselves.with, these knowledge in order to
climb up the ladder, as promotion is related to a considerable extent
to one1s political knowledge which are readily available from the
offical mass media.
Table 4.5 Occupation and Media Consumption
A. Lambda measures between the variables (with media consumption dependent)
Media Consumption Frequency
N ewsp ap er Magazine
hired broad¬













B. Media Consumption Fr ecu en cy
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The percentages under seldom are obatined by adding th° responses in
the never and occasionally categories 01 the questions media consumption
and those under frequently are obtained by adding the responses in the
sometimes and always categories of the questions 011 media consumption
frequency.
Hypothesis 2
The degree of control in media exposure mainly refers to the
audience1s capacity to consume the media at bis or her own discretion.
For example, a reader who owns the newspaper have greater degree of
control in media exposure as he can choose the content as well as
the time for the, reading, whereas participants in collective reading
have less' autonomy as the communication activity is structured and
directed by the authorities® Table 6 shows the general situation
of control and access to various media. Among the various types of
access, the official source is most common in Communist China, and
reflects China1 s style of mass communication. Film is the only mass
medium which is entirely under government control — all interviewees
reported that they either watched movies in the stated-owned cinema or
from mobile projection teams. There is no private source for movies.
Hired-broadcasting ranks second -- over 15% of the interviewees
have been organised to listen to the government through the wired-
loudspeakers.
Magazine end radio seldom come directly from official sources,
as only 95% of the interviewees told us that the magazine they read
belonged to the work unit and the library, and a mere f.6% of them
listened to radio at work places. On the contrary, over 80.5$ possess
their own radio sots and have full access to many of the foreign stations.
When the degree of control in each mass medium is correlated
against the frequency of consumption of that medium,some interesting
results come out. They ore all listed in Table t..7. It is found
that positive correlations exist for all the mass media, though in•L
varying degrees. The strongest association occur in the case of
television (with partial correlation coefficient as O.t) end the
weakest is with newspaper, (partial correlation coefficient being 0.13)«
Most of the interviewees concurred that personal freedom in attending
to the media is much more preferred than coercive exposure to media.
This appears to support the notion that when the audience is allowed
greater freedom, the}7 woul consume and enjoy the media in their own
ways more than mere obligation set by a third party like the
government.-






































Work Unit, Library, Group
Table 47 Kendall Partial Correlation Coefficients: Degree of control
in media exposure and media consumption frequency ::






0.1311 (S.L. = 0.003)
0.1324- (S.L. = 0.002)
0.2383 (S.L. = 0.004)
0.3116 (S.L. - 0.001)
0.4094 (S.L. = 0.001)
-'v The partial correlation coefficients are computed with the
intorviowoos! sex, ago, marital status, education, urban
residence, family social class and province under control.
B. Media Credibility
As far as the credibility of official mass media is concerned,
tiie interviewees did not show a. definite and. consistent attitude
towards them. The assumption that people in a. totalitarian societ tJ
are totally distrustful of the mass communication does not seem to be
strongly supported ay the data, wo gathered from the interviewees as
lifted in Taole 4.°. ihe responses on credioility of official media
mainly fall in the three categories: untrustworthy, neutral and
trustworthy. mere is no special inclination towards the untrustworthy
category.























































































































Political campaign meetings have been rated as untrustworthy by
282% of the sample, which is the highest as compared to others that
ranged from 10p - 25.9a On the other hand, a rather high proportion
thinks that the official mass media, are trustworthy - around 42.65
rate radio as a trustworthy source of information. As remarked by
many interviewees, news items such as those on national technological
development, sports events, party directives, and weather reports are
quite neutral ones which they believe fully. These types of news and
information have added credibility to the official media, therefore,
Ithiol Pe Sola PoolTs assertion about the public's total distrust of
2
the official media does not seem to a.poly in the case of the PEC.-L-i~
Vie have also tried to explore differences in media credibility
ratings among Various social categories by comparing the responses,
but we cannot find any significant correlations except for the
variable of family social class. From Table 4.9, we observe that
positive correlations do exist, though in varying degree, between the
variable and official media credibility. The implication is that
generally, the Reds, being the approved class are more trusting than
the Blacks in the official mass media.
Table U9 Kendall Partial Correlation Coefficients: Family Social
Class and Media Credibility
Media Credibility
N GWsp OX) OX Magazine
Hired















Note: the figures in bracket are the levels of significance
The coefficients are computed with the interviewees1 sex, age, martial
status, education, place of residence, and province keep constant.
However, Ithiel Be Sola Pool1s other notion that the public is
generally apathetic and apolitical appears to be quite prominent in
China. Throughout the interviews, we have observed that many of the
interviewees insisted on checking the No Opinion category because they
do not really care about the media's credibility and do not want to
comment on it. Quite a number of them even remarked that whether
the media are trustworthy or not is not important because since they
ore the government's mouthpiece, one has to rely on the media to
learn the government's intentions and moves. This kind of apathy
and indifference occurs in a significant portion of the interviewees,
as reflected by the percentages in the Neutral category of each
medium on Table I.e.
Personal communications score much higher credibility ratings.
At least 70% of the sample rated the four n.-.jor typos of personal
communication — family communication, communication with relatives,
chatting'.' with friends and chatting with co-workers — as trustworthy
channels of information When compared to the small proportion who
regard official mass media as trustworthy, personal communication
appear to be accepted by the majority as the credible sources of information.
Most of the interviewees reported that when some complex national
news events are brought up in the official media, their usual responses
are to talk with their primary group members for confirmation and
further exploration, and when the issues arc of internationally
concern, they will listen to foreign radios to counter-chc-ck the
official information. Their reliance on foreign radios is fully
reflected in the high percentage (76. 2') checking foreign radios
are trustworthy sources of information.
0. Immigration to Hons: Koncc
Hypothesis 1
In order to see whether the immigrants rely more on personalJ C a.
sources or on mass media for objects to which they have no direct
access, when both are. available, the case of learning about Hong Kong
is used for discussion. Most interviewees reported that their
information about Kong Kong came from the official mass media, Hong
Kong mass media and their personal sources, though the latter two are
in much greater supply.
Although both the mass media and personal sources arc available,
the frequency of use on the part of the immigrants varies a. lot.
Hot very many of them (less than 3d) hare ever used the official
media as source of information, and over half of them learned about
Hong Kong from personal communication in China or uith people of Hong
Kong (Table 410). Among the various sources, the official electronic media
have been'ranked as the least frequent sources, by 34-% of the sample, whereas
the personal communication with family members and friends in hong
Kong have been chosen by 343% of the sample as the most frequently
used source. From these data, personal sources appear to override
mass media, in terms of frequency: of use in learning about objects
without direct access. In regard to reliability, all the personal
sources score much higher than the mass media - over 44% of the sample
regard personal sources as most trustworthy, and less than 13% check
mass media as their most trustworthy source of information. Therefore,
the general tendency of the immigrants is to rely on personal sources
more than mass media for information about objects they have no direct
access when both are available. The hypothesis is confirmed by the
empiric al data.
Table U»0 Sources of Information about Hong Kong - Their Frequency
of use and Reliability














































4 0.7%) 34 (14.9%) 0 (0.0%)
70 (30.4%) 0 (0.0%) 42 (18.1%)
175 (76.1%) 0 (0.0%) 126 (54.3%)
»
126 (54.8%) 14 (6.2%) 78 (33.6%)
148 (64.3%) 32 (14.0%) 94 (40.5%)
J 23C N 228 N 232
0 (0.0%) 4 (2.0%)
4 (1.7%) 26 (13.0%)
0 (0.0%) 116 (58.5%)
11 (4.7%) 92 (46.5%)
46 (19.8%) 88 (44.4%)
N 232 N 198
Hypothesis 2
When asked whether inconsistencies on information about Hong
Kong existed or not, most of the interviewees gave a positive answer.
The most general response to the inconsistencies (checked by nearly
half of the sample) as indicated in Table 4-. 11 is to correspond with
relatives and friends in Hong Kong. Discussion with friends, family
members and visitors have also been used by about 20% as sources of
reality validation. Only a few of them havo mentioned the use of
mass media to cross-check various pieces of information. It appears
that the general tendency is to rely on personal communications for
validation if they are available. Therefore, Hypothesis 2 is confirmed
Table 4.1 T'.'b Response to Inconsistencies on Information about Hong Kong
Response IIo. of Respondents Total
Ignore
Choose the information from the
most reliable source
Discuss with family members
Discuss with friends
Talk with visitor from Hong Kong
Correspond with relatives and















The interviewees generally did not seem to have exceedingly
good images of Hong Kong before immigrating, as reflected from Table 4.12.
The ones who have checked in favor of Hong Kong do not constitute a very
high proportion. Among the ten different aspects, about five, namely,
political aspect, making money, finding jobs, standard of living and
education have impressed about 40% of the sample for the other five
aspects, the interviewees generally think they are average. Although
their perceptions of Hong Kong are not particularly desirable, we still
observe that the. unfavorable scores are low-- less than 11% of
them have assigned unfavorable against seven aspects. The more
significant finding perhaps lies in the response category of unknown.
There is a notable average of 20% who did not have any knowledge
about the different aspects of Hong Kong- the standard of living is
the only aspect which is known to most of them (99.8%). When the
interviewees were asked about this phenomenon, they simply replied
that this was the most common concern among the immigrants as the
majority left China in order to improve their standard of living.
A recent study of the Southern Daily from 1979 to 1980, has
found that the paper had constructed the picture of Hong Kong as
follows:3 Hong Kong is a highly capitalistic society full of social
problems; though technologically and economically advanced. It
has poor, law and order, finding jobs is difficult, living conditions
are poor, welfare systems are shaky, interpersonal relationships
are weak; the standard of living and chances of making money are only
a bit better than in Communist China. The overall picture is that
Hong Kong is not a good place to live. If this official view had
been congruent with the perceptions of the immigrants, they might
not have fled to Hong Kong. A close comparision on the official
picture and the immigrants1 perceptions reveal the following main
differences. First,the poor aspects portrayed by the Southern Daily
are not perceived as poor by the immigrants. For areas such
as political life, making money, finding jobs, standard of living and
welfare, only a small percentage (less than seven percent) think that
these are unfavorable. Most of the interviewees tend to adopt a
rather neutral or even positive view on these important areas.
Second, although in some aspects like law and order, living conditions
and human relationship of the immigrants appear to be less favorable,
going more in line with the official view, still not an overwhelming portion
are congruent the official view (only about 30'; in each case).
Those and the overall positive perceptions by the immigrants
(Table 4.13) all lend support to our 1 hypothesis that media images are
different from the perceptions of the immigrants about Hong Kong. The
fact that the two arc different may be accounted for by the immigrants1
reliance on personal communications as their sources of information as well
as their channels of reality validation in knowing about Hong Kong.
Table L. 12 Impression on Various Aspects of I-Tona Kon
Aspects of lions Kor
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c' The overall image score is computed by subtracting the number
of unfavorable responses from that of the favorable. If they
balance off one another, the image is neutml, but if one outnumber
the other } the resulting score will either be positive or
negative.
Hypothesis i
In regard to the overall favorable image of Hong K$ng, its partial
correlation (keeping all the social-economic background variables
content) with the immigrantsT degree of determination was lomid to boi
0.07 (Table 4.14), which implies a very weak relationship between
the two variables. This weak association has also been hinted
when the interviewees were asked about the importance of the favorable
image of Hong Koxjg in their decision to Immigrate. Host of them
remarked piainly that whether Hong Kong is an extremely good place
to live or not is not very important, as long as it is better than
China in terms of deomcratic life and standard of living.
In considering hong Kong as their future home, their primary concerns are
freedom (i.e. political aspect) and better standard of living, the other aspect!
of Hong Kong are only of secondary importance. These comments appear
to agree with their responses on the attractions of Hong Kong, as
nearly half of thorn wore attracted by the political and economic
aspects of Hong Kong (Table 415)® Their concerns on these two
aspects also explain why their overall favorable image of Kong Kong
does not correlate significantly with their degree of determination,
as their impressions on the other aspects, being more or less average.,,
have pulled down the overall score of the degree of the favorable
image (Table 4.13). Then adding only the two aspects as the favorable
image score, we find a rather good association with their degree of
determination, with the partial correlation coefficient being 0•42
(Table 4.14) This lends support to the notion that favorable image
of concerned aspects correlates positively with the immigrants1 degree
of determination.
Table 4.14 Kendall Partial Correlation Coefficients for the
Immigrants Strength of Determination -
Strength of Determination
Overall Favorable image of Hong Kong
Favorable image on concerned aspects
Degree of primary group involvement--
Tt • 1 T
Family lush ---
0.07 (S.L. = 0.030)
0.4-2 (S.L. = 0.001)
0.25 (S.L. = 0.003)




These partial correlation coefficients are computed with the
interviewees1 sex, age, martial- status, education, urban
residence, family so'cialclass and province under control.
The scores of this variable is computed by adding the
individual score of Question VI 6 -8.
The push factor is the not score after subtracting the pull
factor scores from the push scores.
Family Push Score = (Sum of Scores of Questions VI 3 - 5) 1
(Score of Question VI a - Score of Question 112) x (Average
Score of Question II 4 - 7)•
Table 4.15 Attraction of Hong Kong
Attraction of Hong Kong Ho. o f I. nt ervi ewe e s Total
Political (Democracy)
Social.(Family Reunion)







Hypo the sic 5
When considering the relation between group approval and the
immigrants1 degree of determination, it is important to look at
what these groups are. We have located four major types of social
groups: family, relatives, friends and co-workers. Table 4«1 shows
the involvement of these four groups in the involvement of these four
groups in the immigrants1 decision marking process. It was found that
the majority of the immigrants have involved their family, and only
some of them have relied on the other groups. The family group
appears to be the main context where the immigrants discuss options,
share information, and seek approval and support. This shows that in the
PRC, the family may still be functioning as an important social unit where
major decisions take place, and it is quite significant in affecting one's
behaviour. And the Communists have not been able to replace the family by
the official small group.
;lien the degree of group involvement is correlated to the
immigrants' degree of determination) a positive partial correlation of
0.25 was found (Table 4.14), showing support to our original hypothesis.
The usual course of decision-making, as explained by the interviewees,
is quite similar to what Doflour has postulated in his persuasionJu
model. The immigrants talked with, asked and sought the advice and
approval from their own groups. Only a few (loss than ten) never
involved others in their process of decision-making or ma.de their
decision against the group's opinion, there is a significant portion
(totally 32 - Table 4.17) who lust follow th.e group norm in the village
and set off their journeys They remarked that all the young people
in the village had gone and so it appeared to them that the appropriate
venture is to leave for Hong Kong. Host of the people in this group
are ignorant about Hong Kong, they do not have any special motivations,
it is under the social pressure and normative behaviour that they
decided to risk their lives for the iourncv to Hong Kong. ThisO y O w
reflects the important role of group approvals and normative
r--in
communications in affooting one!s behaviour.






















Table A 17 Reasons For Choosing Hong Kong
Reasons For Choosing Hong Kong ITo« oj° Respondents Total
Proximity
Relatives to depend on
i











When discussing the family push factor,we heed to look at the
various itsms that constitute the factor which include family cohesion,
family ties in Ilong Kong, the urge for family reunion, and his desire
to improve the family's standard of living. Concerning family cohesion,
from Table 4.18, we observe that the majority of the immigrants show
strong family cohesion which reflects that in the PRC, the
importance of the family still cannot be under-rated. About one
ft
quarter have checked family reunion as the attraction of Hong Kong
(Table +15) 9 whereas about one third of the interviewees reported
that they left China in order to improve the family Ts standard of
living (Table 4. 19)» In regard to family composition and ties, the
majority of the interviewees have their ne:ct-of-kin in China (Table. A.20)f and onlv
a small portion had their nuclear families in Hong Kong (Table 421). An
overview of all these attributes reveals that the family push factor
does exist, lint is not as strong as wo may lia.vo expected.
When the net family push (the total push - the total pull) is
correlated to the immigrants1 degree of determination, the partial
correlation coefficient was found to be 013 (Table 4.14), which
supports our hypothesis that the higher the family push, the greater
the strength of determination.
Table 413 Strength of Family Cohesion
Family Cohesion Variables
Strength of Family Cohesion




F amily Imp o rt an c e x -
216 (91.57)
14-6 (61.85)











Family Relation (Question II 4): Those who checked, answers (a)
and (b) are assigned Strong'1, and those checking
(c) and (d) are as .signed weak.
Family Communication
.Question II 5): Those who checked answers (a)
and. (b) are assigned Strong, and those checking
(c) and (d) arc assigned weak.
Family Obedienc e vQuestion ITU6): Those checking answers (a) and (b)
are assigned. Strong, while those checking (c) and
(d) arc assigned weak.
F ami ly Imp o rt an c e Question II 7) : Those checking answer (a.) ,
are assigned Strong, while those checking
(b) are assigned weak.
Table 4.19 Reasons For Leaving China
Reasons For Leavina China No. of Respondents Total
Political Reason
Improve One's Standard of
Living










Table 4.20 Family Composition in China
Family Composition Ho. of Respondents
Self Only 0 (0.0%)
Self + SiblingAife 12 (5.3%)
Self + ParentsChildren 173(73.1%)
Self T Parents -I- Children 33(16.7%)
Self + Parents + Children Grand Parents 0 (0.0%)
Total 228(100%)
: This refers to those family members living under the same roof.
Table 4.21 . FamilyRelatives in Hong Kong
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The three variables in the immigrants1 decision as indicated
earlier, were all found to rolate positively with the immigrants1
strength of determination. In order to disentangle the not effect
of ench of these variables, we have tried another set of partial
i
correlation, each time keeping two of the variables constant. The
results are listed in Table 422. We find that 0:1 the whole all the
partial correlations have been maintained considerably. This
demonstrates that the three variables are independent of one another,
each alone may relate quite significantly with the immigrants' strength
of determination.
Table 1.22 Kendall Partial Correlation Coefficients
. Strength of Peterminatio]
Favorable image 011 concerned aspects
Degree of Group Approval
Family Push
0.4025 (S.L. = 0.001)
0.21 (G.J,. - 0.003)
0.221C (S.L. = 0.012)
Conclusion
In this study, we have explored into the immigrants relations
with the mass media in terms of their consumption and evaluation of
the media when they were in China, and on the role of communication in
affecting their decision to immigrate to Hong Kong. Concerning the
immigrants consumption patterns of the Chinese mass media, we find
that the social stratification approach offers good explanations to
media consumption frequency in the PRC Different social categories,
as shown by our data, do show different media consumption tendencies.
Education, occupation, place of residence, and family social class
have been confirmed in to be fairly good predictors of the immigrants
media consumption patterns. The family social class particularly, has
been noted as a unique variable for media behaviour in the Chinese
Communist society.
The Chinese extensive use of communication for mass persuasion
is further affirmed by the immigrants — the receiver, newspaper,
wired broadcasting and films do penetrate considerably into various
places of the nation. Magazinefor their special coverage, and
television, for its technological requisite have found to be less
popular. The small groups, which flourished in early Communist China,
appear to be losing dominance.in contcmporaiy Chine.
In evaluating the maas media on their credibility, it appeara
that the Chinese immigrants do find the official sources trustworthy
in a number of aspects like weather reports, technical knowledge,
sports events etc. But, among all social groups, only the Reds
show a more consistent trusting attitude towards the official media.
Our original postulate that the public is totally distrustful of
official media cannot be established, however, the general apathy to
the mass medis is found to be another rather significant feature
in the Chinese scene.
As far as the. role of communication in affecting immigration
behaviour is concerned, the importance of personal communications
override that of mass media in the immigrants1 process of decision-O -u
making. Immigrants rely much more on inter-personal communication
than on mass media for information seeking and reality validation about
objects they have no direct access when both arc available. This Is
in support of the general dependence on personal contacts for
information in a totalitarian society.
In making decision for immigration communication has dual roles.
On one hand, personal communication Is significant for constructing
the image of Hong Kong in tho minds of the Immigrants; on the other,
group and normative communications facilitate interpretations, summert— J_ J .L _j_
and approval for the immigrants1 decision.
Overall, our study has highlighted on several importantf tJ I- J U -J-
relations between the media and the illegal immigrants from China,
be do not attempt to generalise from this special social groun to»—' X '— Jl.
the entire Chinese population, however, the media behaviour of the
immigrants should, give good hints to the comnuni c at ion patterns and
process in contemporary China, and also point to the areas cf future
communication research in China.
NOTE - CHAPTER FOUR
1• See China Official Annual Report, 1981. published by Kingsway
Publications Ltd.. 1981.. p. 619.
2, Ithiel De Sola Pool. op. cit., p. Z.62 - 509.
3 These data are taken iron a recent term project by a graduate
student of communication of the Chinese University of Hong Kong,
Based on the contents of the Southern Pally (a newspaper published
in Sfuangdong) and his own analysis, the student worked out the picture
of Hong Kong as portrayed by this official Chinese newspaper.
+. Kelvin De Eleur, op. cit.. p. 26 - 254-.
5 Godwin Chu, op. cit., p. 15-33.
6. Ithiel De Sola Pool, op. cit.. p. 4.62 ~ 509.
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